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Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay:
Variable Bargain Models of Fairness
Raymond T. Nimmer*
INTRODUCTION
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, section 362(a) of the
federal Bankruptcy Code' imposes an automatic stay on various actions by creditors to collect their claims against the
debtor, including actions to enforce a security interest by foreclosure against the debtor's property. Application of the automatic stay to secured creditors in business reorganization cases
under Chapter 11 of the Code, however, presents significant issues involving a balance between protecting secured creditors
and allowing debtors to restructure their business operations.
Courts resolve these issues primarily by application of section
362(d) (1) of the Code, which permits relief from the automatic
stay "for cause, including the lack of adequate protection" of
2
the creditor's interest in the collateral.
From the numerous reported decisions and articles on
standards for relief from the automatic stay, two dominant and
conflicting propositions emerge concerning the character of the
protection to which the creditor is or should be entitled. The
first provides that the creditor need only be protected against
decline in the recoverable value of the collateral during the period in which the right to foreclose is barred by the automatic
stay.3 The second proposition suggests that the creditor must
also be compensated for lost use of the investment represented
4
by the value of the collateral.
This Article examines both propositions in light of the statutory framework and current case law, and concludes that
neither proposition provides a valid policy ground or a valid
model of the manner in which cases are currently decided.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Houston College of
Law.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. V 1981).

2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
3. See infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
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Both propositions emphasize unitary economic constructs,
whereas more sensitive and balanced analyses are required
and are actually applied by the courts. The Article proposes a
third model in which loss of recoverable value represents a
baseline consideration, and in which further forms of protection are considered in a broad-based analysis encompassing
the nature and history of the loan transaction, the behavior of
the parties, and the prospects of or activity toward reorganization. Applying the proposed model to reported cases involving
security interests reveals that the model approximates the
manner in which cases are currently decided.
I. ADEQUATE PROTECTION: FRAMING THE ISSUE
The automatic stay imposed by section 362(a) of the Code
applies in all bankruptcy proceedings and generally functions
to channel post-petition collection issues into a single forum.
Further operative purposes of the stay vary with the type of
proceeding involved and the nature of the entity on which it is
imposed.
In Chapter 11 reorganizations, a central function of the stay
is to preserve the debtor's assets for a period adequate to accommodate efforts to restructure business operations and thus
preserve a going concern. This function is ancillary to the overall objectives of a reorganization proceeding, described as follows in a congressional report on the Bankruptcy Code:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to
operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce
a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization
is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which
they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for
scrap.... It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets. 5

The goal of reorganization is to optimize value to creditors by
preserving the "going concern" value of the debtor's assets. In
practice, this goal is often commingled with the view that the
debtor has a protectable interest in economic survival. 6
Regardless of the justification for reorganization, the automatic stay creates a potential transfer of value from the secured creditor to the debtor's estate which is most readily
5. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6179.

6. See, e.g., In re Chugiak Boat Works, Inc., 18 Bankr. 292, 298 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1982); In re Aurora Cord & Cable Co., 2 Bankr. 342, 346 (Bankr. N.D. Ill
1980); In re Heatron, Inc., 6 Bankr. 493, 496 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
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described as a potential, if not a presumptive, exchange of individual interests for collective benefits. The secured creditor's
access to the collateral is deferred, thereby creating various potentials for individual loss, but the debtor's continued access to
and use of the collateral may yield substantial benefits for the
creditor community and the estate as a whole.
Absent restraints, an automatic stay would generate such
transfers of value indiscriminately. Section 362(d) (1), however,
provides that the automatic stay should be modified "for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property."7 The issue of adequate protection may be raised in
either of two contexts. Generally, the secured creditor must
file a request for relief. In this context, notwithstanding any
pre-petition default in the security agreement, the debtor's retention and continued use of the collateral is presumed until a
request for relief is filed, whereupon the debtor assumes the
burden of establishing that the creditor is adequately protected.8 The second context is limited to cases involving the
use of cash collateral. Under section 363(c) (2), the debtor may
not use cash collateral without prior authorization by the
court.9 The court is required to place such limitations on the
use of cash collateral as are necessary to "provide adequate
protection."'0
In either context, the standard of "adequate protection"
mediates the conflicting interests of the creditor and the
debtor's estate. The congressional report previously quoted described the role of adequate protection as follows:
[The] concept of adequate protection is based as much on policy
7. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1) (Supp. V 1981). Section 362 also provides alternative grounds for relief from, or modification of, the stay. Although § 362(d) (1)
has been the most often discussed, the alternative ground defined in 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d) (2) (Supp. V 1981) has also been controversial. Section 362(d) (2) provides that relief from the stay should be granted if the debtor has no equity in
the property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
This provision was designed primarily to thwart efforts by highly leveraged real
estate investors to use the automatic stay to delay foreclosure in order to gain
tax advantages unrelated to reorganizational efforts. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 5787, 583839. Section 362(d) (2) is, thus, frequently raised as an issue in real estate cases.
With the exception of stringent interpretations of "necessity" in consumer
cases under Chapter 13, however, the standards actually employed under
§ 362(d) (2) generally conform to those employed in adequate protection analysis. See Nimmer, Real Estate Creditorsand the Automatic Stay: A Study in BehavioralEconomics, 1983 A=z. ST. I.J. -, 8. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (Supp. V 1981).
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (Supp. V 1981).
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grounds as on constitutional grounds. Secured creditors should not be
deprived of the benefit of their bargain. There may be situations in
bankruptcy where giving a secured creditor an absolute right to his
bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the bankruptcy
laws. Thus, this section recognizes the availability of alternate means
of protecting a secured creditor's interest. Though the creditor might
not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose of [section 361] is to insure
that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he bargained for. 1 1

Adequate protection is thus legislatively defined in terms
of a balance between reorganization objectives and preservation of the creditor's contractual rights. Modification of the secured creditor's bargain is justified by the desire to provide an
opportunity for the restructuring necessary to retain the going
concern value of the debtor.12 The concept of adequate protection interposes a basic limitation on this modification, entitling
the creditor to receive "in value essentially what [was] bargained for."13
Implicit in this design is the supposition that the debtor's
continued use of the collateral facilitates achievement of reorganization objectives. This connection between the secured
property and the reorganization process is a basic prerequisite
to justifying any limitation on the creditor's bargained-for
rights. Although courts have varied in their descriptions of this
requirement, they have generally recognized that the debtor
must establish that the property is indeed needed for
14
reorganization.
The primary issue, assuming the collateral is needed for reorganization, concerns the conditions under which the stay
should be retained or terminated. This issue can be addressed
from two perspectives; both ultimately contribute to defining
appropriate policy. The first perspective focuses on resolution
of the equities between the two immediate parties and concerns the degree of risk or restraint justified by the particular
11. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 5963, 6295.
12. As noted previously, the functional purposes of the stay vary with the
type of proceeding in which the stay is being applied. In liquidation cases, the
primary role of the stay is to stabilize collection activities and allow for orderly
collection and liquidation of assets. A conceptual problem arises in applying
the stay in Chapter 11 proceedings contemplating substantial liquidation of the
debtor's assets. See In re Koopmans, 22 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14. See Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MIcH. J.L.
REF. 175, 245-59 (1978). Although the focus at this level is on need, ultimately it
is necessary to establish the feasibility of reorganizing. Id. See In re Terra Mar
Assocs., 3 Bankr. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980) (regarding 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d) (2) (Supp. V. 1981)); Nimmer, supra note 7, at -.

BANKRUPTCY

1983]

context. For example, where a creditor assumed atypical risks
through pre-petition conduct,1s continuation of those risks may
be appropriate, especially where potentially successful efforts
toward reorganization are present. Conversely, where the
debtor has entered bankruptcy for the sole purpose of delay,
termination of the stay may be appropriate.16 The variations
are numerous, but the critical aspect is that analysis is confined
to the individual parties involved in a specific case.
In contrast, the second perspective focuses on the broader
implications for general patterns of secured financing. Section
362 alters the secured creditor's right to relatively immediate
access to its collateral after default. To the extent this modification reduces the perceived volue of security interests in general, there will be corrective effects in the cost of secured credit
and in creditors' willingness to lend.17 While some impact is
unavoidable, an appropriate goal is to pursue reorganization
objectives in a manner that maximizes potential gain to the estate while minimizing effects detrimental to secured lending.
As indicated by the section 362 reference to protecting an
"interest in property" and the congressional reference to the
"essential value" of the creditor's bargain, the statute intends
to establish a basic minimum beyond which the secured creditor's rights may not be infringed.
I.

DEFINING THE BARGAIN

The basic distinguishing factor of a secured loan is the
creditor's right to ultimately rely on selected collateral for recovery of all or part of the loan. The character of that right is
affected by the nature of the property and the ratio of the property's value to the size of the outstanding obligation. By imposing a conditional delay on foreclosure, section 362 potentially
affects this right whenever the recoverable value available to
the creditor is declining. As will be discussed below, it is generally agreed that protection against this effect is implicit
within the concept of adequate protection.18
Beyond this interest in collateral, however, the interests of
15. See In re El Patio, Ltd., 6 Bankr. 518, 523 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); In re
Orlando Coals, Inc., 6 Bankr. 721, 724-25 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980).
16. See In re Andrews, 17 Bankr. 515, 519 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re Eggers, 19 Bankr. 225, 226 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
17. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 877 (1982); Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and PrioritiesAmong Creditors,88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1148 (1979).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 21-34.
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secured creditors and unsecured creditors are in some instances congruent. Both, for example, share expectations that
the debt will be repaid voluntarily and that there will be a periodic cash flow under the terms of the note. With regard to both
of these expectations, the secured creditor's existing property
interest in the collateral operates as a lever encouraging payment.19 Further, both secured and unsecured creditors anticipate a return on their investment in the form of interest.
Secured creditors are distinguished from other creditors, however, by the relative ease with which they can normally recover
and reinvest assets through foreclosure if payments are not
forthcoming. Arguably, by delaying the right of foreclosure,
section 362 creates a situation in which secured creditors
20
should be compensated for lost reinvestment opportunities.
Depending on the nature of the loan transaction, the relationship between the secured creditor and the debtor may be
substantially more complex than described thus far. For example, in various contexts the creditor does not rely on the current collateral, but relies instead on the debtor's operations to
transform the collateral and produce a net gain. Such reliance
is common in real estate construction or conversion loans, as
well as in floating lien financing on inventory or accounts receivable. Because of the substantial reliance on, and interest
in, the debtor's current operations, these transactions are more
akin to joint ventures than to static, traditional types of debt relationships. In such transactions, the expectation of gain from
the debtor's operations forms part of the value of the creditor's
bargain.
Against this complex background, attempts to develop a
conceptual framework for adequate protection have been surprisingly limited and incomplete. Two dominant approaches
have developed, but, as will be seen, both are limited to purely
financial elements, ignoring behavioral and transactional factors. Both fail because they attempt to define universal standards independent of significant contextual and transactional
variations.

A. .RECOVERABLE VALUE
The first approach defines adequate protection in terms of
the current recoverable value of the collateral to the creditor.
19. See 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDoNNEL, SECURITY
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.04(3) (1983).
20.

See infra text accompanying notes 36-51.
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Under this view, adequate protection requires attention to such
factors as depreciation, damage, and the accrual of senior interests, to the extent these factors reduce the amount that the individual creditor can recover from the collateral. Where excess
collateral or the absence of depreciation ensures no reduction
in recoverable value, the adequate protection standard is satisfied without any further action by the debtor. For example, in
In re Alyucan, 21 a real estate case arising under section 362, the
court retained the automatic stay with the following comments:
[T] he "interest in property" entitled to protection is not measured by
the amount of the debt but by the value of the lien. A mushrooming
debt, through accrual of interest... may be immaterial, if the amount
of the lien is not thereby increased, while vicissitudes in the market,
loss of insurance or other factors affecting the value of the lien are relevant ....
In this proceeding, the ... lien of Bankers Life ... is a first lien
.... The collateral and therefore the lien are not declining or subject
to sudden depreciation in value. Bankers Life is suffering no pain cognizable under Section 362 as a result of the stay, and relief from the
stay is therefore, at this juncture, unnecessary.2 2

Although commentators frequently criticize this view of adequate protection as too limited, they often assume it to be the
one adopted by Congress.2 3 This conclusion is suggested by
other sections of the Code and the legislative history of section
362. For example, section 361 of the Code illustrates three
modes through which adequate protection may be furnished to
a creditor. Included are periodic cash payments and replacement liens "to the extent that [the] stay ... results in a decrease in the value of [the creditor's] interest in [the]
property."24 In describing the option of periodic cash payments, the Senate committee report noted:
The use of periodic payments may be appropriate where, for example,
the property in question is depreciating at a relatively fixed rate. The
periodic payments would be to compensate for the depreciation and
might, but need not necessarily, be in the same amount as payments
25
due on the secured obligation.

Furthermore, in reporting the final draft of the Code on the
floor of Congress, the sponsors noted that "[a]dequate protection . . . is intended to protect a creditor's allowed secured
21. 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
22. Id. at 808-09 (footnote omitted).
23. See, e.g., Fortang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1154-56 (1981); Note, Automatic Stay
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Equitable Roadblock to Secured Creditor
Relief, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1113, 1132 (1980).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (Supp. V 1981).
25. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 5787, 5840.
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claim." 26 Under section 506(a) of the Code an "allowed claim
*

.

.is a secured claim to the extent of the value of [the] credi-

tor's interest... in such property."2 7 The focus is on the value
of the property recoverable by the creditor, and thus the thrust
of adequate protection is to prevent or compensate for any reduction in such value.
The recoverable value approach to adequate protection is
further suggested by earlier drafts of the current Code. The automatic stay provisions of the Code derive in part from draft
legislation prepared by the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States. In its report, the Commission described adequate protection as related to "the anticipated decrease in the value of collateral as a result of use. ' 28 The
objective of the standard was to permit use of the property subject to payments or other transfers that would compensate the
secured creditor for the decline in recoverable value. 29
In assessing the relationship between adequate protection
and recoverable value, it is necessary to distinguish two propositions. The first is that protection against or compensation
for loss is included within adequate protection. This limited
premise is amply supported by the Code and its legislative history. Indeed, since the adoption of section 362, there has been
little debate that such protection or compensation represents a
baseline requirement for retention of the automatic stay. The
creditor's ultimate right to recover from the property is inherent in all secured loans and, to the extent that adequate protection is intended to preserve the value of the bargain to the
creditor, protection against or compensation for a loss in the
value of the collateral must be included.
A second proposition, often expressed in juxtaposition to
claims that adequate protection requires compensation for
other financial losses, 3 0 is that protection of recoverable value
represents the sole element of adequate protection. The pri26.
27.

124 CONG. REC. 32, 395 (1978) (remarks of Congressman Edwards).
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. V 1981).

28.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPTcY LAWS OF THE UNITED

STATES, pt. II, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. 237 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as COMUSSION REPORT].

29. See id. at 236. The Commission referenced this approach to the preCode case of In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the court
conditioned the stay on payments equivalent to the "economic depreciation" of
the property. Significantly, perhaps, Bermec involved a loan secured by the
debtor's equipment. As discussed below, under the Code, depreciation tends to
be the primary financial issue in equipment cases. See infra text accompanying notes 59-69.
30. See In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah
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mary support for this proposition lies in a negative inference
drawn from the legislative history and final version of the Code:
although protection against reinvestment opportunity losses
was discussed in the legislative process along with recoverable
value protection, only the latter was clearly enacted within the
Code.31 While it is possible to infer that opportunity cost was
thus excluded from the concept of adequate protection, there
are clear indications that Congress did not intend to exclude it
32
in all cases.
The proposition that adequate protection is limited solely
to protection of recoverable value is strongly oriented toward
the interests of the estate at the expense of the secured creditor. Applied in pure form, it contemplates protective action
only to the extent that recoverable value actually declines or
there is a risk of decline. When property value is stable, the
debtor has access to the benefits of continued use of the property on a cost-free basis, resulting in a transfer of value to the
estate, while the creditor is locked into an investment without
compensating income. This situation raises serious questions of
individual fairness, especially where the investment is large
and the delay is lengthy. Furthermore, the risk of such loss
may affect the cost and availability of secured lending,33 and
may create an incentive for premature foreclosure on existing

liens.34

1981); In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 712-13 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1981).
31. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1799 (1976) (reprinting Murphy, Use of Collateralin Business Rehabiliations: A Suggested Redrafting of the Bankruptcy
Reform Ac4 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1483 (1975)).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 39-44.
33. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 17, at 877.
34. The incentive for premature foreclosure to avoid entanglement in
bankruptcy may not relate solely to tangible or identifiable economic effects. In
any event, however, the extent to which the incentive is acted upon will relate
to the effectiveness of pre-filing foreclosure in removing the collateral from the
estate. If this result can be achieved by physical seizure without pre-filing sale,
the desirability of preemptive action is increased by the increased likelihood
that it will succeed. In contrast, if the property remains in the estate until a
sale is completed, the incentive to act is reduced since it is less likely that the
creditor will be able to avoid entanglement in the bankruptcy case. The point
in the foreclosure process at which the property is effectively removed from the
estate has been the subject of significant controversy. The Supreme Court,
however, recently provided some clarification, holding that repossession of the
debtor's property prior to bankruptcy does not remove the property from the
reorganization estate. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2309, 2315
(1983).
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OPPORTUNITY VALUE

The foregoing model assumes that significant detriments
may be imposed on secured lenders. A competing model argues that adequate protection requires more extensive
financial protection, approximating a full equivalence of bargained-for benefits other than the immediate right to foreclose.
In practice, this model is often presented in connection with
the view that secured creditors should be compensated for lost
35
reinvestment opportunities.
This additional compensation is in part supported by equitable considerations relating to the individual creditor. Writing
prior to the adoption of the current Code, Patrick A. Murphy
argued:
[I]f the interim cash payments alternative is used, perhaps the secured
creditor should receive interest or compensation for its cost of funds.
This ... idea may seem shocking at first because it has been long
recognized in bankruptcy that a secured creditor is entitled to the payment of interest only in the event that it holds surplus security ....
Nevertheless ....
[ilf the stay of the marginally secured creditor is
properly viewed as an involuntary loan of property to the debtor, there
seems little reason not to afford the secured creditor some protection
against the ravages of inflation and the fact that his own creditors have
36
not given him an interest moratorium.

This position is also partly supported by the goal of minimizing
the adverse effects of the automatic stay on secured lending
patterns under nonbankruptcy law.
A major difficulty with this model of adequate protection is
the paucity of support for it within the Code and its legislative
history. Commentators urging protection of opportunity values
often acknowledge that it is not mandated by the Code.37 To
the extent that it is argued that this protection is required
under current law, the analysis typically focuses on interpretation of the reference in section 361 to "the value of [the creditor's] interest in ... property" in light of the congressional
reference to protecting the "value" for which the creditor bargained. An example is the discussion in In re Monroe Park,
where the court noted:
If [the creditor] had been allowed to foreclose on the mortgaged
property at the time the bankruptcy petition was fied, it could have reinvested the money gained . . . at current interest rates ....
This
right of recourse to the collateral is an important part of the value of
35. See, e.g., Fortang & King, supra note 23, at 1153-65; Jackson, supra note
17, at 872-77; Murphy, supra note 31, at 1506.
36. Murphy, supra note 31, at 1506.
37. See, e.g., Fortang & King, supra note 35, at 1150; Jackson, supra note 17,
at 877.
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[the creditor's] interest in property which must be fully protected....
[I]t was incumbent upon [the debtor] to provide some form of relief
which would compensate [the creditor] for the loss of use of its money
38
or to supply some 'indubitable equivalent' of the accruing interest.

The court's discussion illustrates a tendency to blend references to "value" with the references to "indubitable
equivalent." The latter term is found in section 361, which lists
several illustrative forms of adequate protection, one of them
being any method designed to provide the "indubitable
equivalent" of the creditor's interest.39 The language derives
from the pre-Code case of In re Murel Holding Corp.,40 which
dealt with confirmation standards under former section
207(b) (5) and held that treatment of the secured creditor must
be
completely compensatory and that payment ten years hence is not
generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is indeed the common measure of the difference, but a creditor who fears the safety of
his principal will scarcely be content with that; he wishes to get his
money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the
statute was intended to deprive him of that... unless by a substitute
41
of the most indubitable equivalence.

Thus, the statutory reference to "indubitable equivalent" suggests that opportunity cost or interest is an appropriate element of adequate protection. But Murel goes further,
indicating that interest alone may not be adequate if other factors indicate a risk of ultimate nonpayment.
In assessing the role of opportunity cost in adequate protection, it is necessary to distinguish two propositions analogous to those previously noted in reference to the recoverable
value model. The first, which has strong statutory. support, is
that compensation of opportunity cost and other financial elements of a bargain is appropriate in some cases. 42 Adequate
protection was proposed and enacted as a flexible remedy to be
tailored to the specific case and this element of protection
might be desirable in some contexts. Furthermore, as the preceding discussion indicates, the statutory reference to "indubitable equivalent" suggests that issues beyond recoverable
value are properly considered within adequate protection. It is
a misinterpretation of section 361, however, to view indubitable
equivalence as a baseline protection applicable in all cases.
38. In re Monroe Park, 17 Bankr. 934, 940 (D. Del. 1982) (citations omitted).

39. 11 U.S.C. § 361(c) (Supp. V 1981).
40. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
41. Id. at 942.
42. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (Supp. V 1981). See also supra text accom-

panying note 41.
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The illustrative, nonexclusive list of adequate protection formats in section 361 juxtaposes indubitable equivalence with
two other formats that are expressly concerned with depreciation or dissipation of recoverable value. The apparent meaning
is that any of these, or other analogous formats, may be appropriate in selected cases and that compensation for opportunity
cost is not precluded by the Code.
Similarly, other portions of the Code expressly protect the
secured creditor's opportunity cost in selected cases. For example, although interest is generally not allowed to accrue after the bankruptcy petition, an exception is made for the claims
of oversecured creditors. 43 While this exception applies to allowed claims and not to adequate protection, it indicates a willingness to incorporate post-petition investment interests in at
least some cases. Indeed, in the context of real estate cases,
many courts use this exception to protect reinvestment oppor44
tunities without discussion of the underlying doctrinal issue.
The second, alternative proposition is that compensation
for opportunity cost is required in all cases. Although the Code
provides only marginal support for this view, several courts
have directly or indirectly adopted it.45 This proposition relies
on policy considerations related to defining the proper relationship between the secured creditor and the bankruptcy estate.
It is premised on the goals of fairness to individual creditors
and minimal interference with "normal" patterns of secured
financing. "Normal" in this context is defined as financing
under prevailing non-bankruptcy law. The ultimate premise is
that bankruptcy rules should avoid inconsistency with these
external norms.46
This view is often supported by general references to the
importance of secured financing and to the expectation that
any diminution of secured creditors' rights under bankruptcy
law will adversely affect the cost and availability of credit. A
recent article by Thomas Jackson attempts to elevate this posi43. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. V 1981).
44. See In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 808 n.10 (Bankr. D.
Arguably, however, even for overUtah 1981); Nimmer, supra note 7, at -.
secured creditors, § 506(b) should not be viewed as requiring post-petition accumulation of interest in all cases. See OToole, Adequate Protection and
Postpetition Interest in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 56 Am. BAFRU. L.J. 251, 271-72
(1982).
45. See, e.g., In re Monroe Park, 17 Bankr. 934, 940 (D. Del. 1982); In re Virginia Foundry Co., 9 Bankr. 493, 498 (W.D. Va. 1981); In re Anchorage Boat
Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635, 643 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
46. See COMUSSION REPORT, supra note 28, pt. I, at 68-74.

1983]

BANKRUPTCY

tion to a policy-based model concerning intercreditor distribution rules4 7 Jackson suggests that bankruptcy rules allocating
resources among creditors should be designed in terms of the
bargain that economically rational creditors would be expected
to negotiate ex ante. From this model, and the assumption that
secured lending results in "aggregate efficiencies" benefiting
both secured and unsecured creditors, Jackson concludes that
adequate protection should be defined so that, economically,
the secured creditor will be "indifferent as between receiving
... cash, today, and leaving [the collateral in possession of the
debtor]."48 This requires, in Jackson's view, reference to "market-pricing mechanisms" to compensate the creditor for
delayed access to the collateral. Withholding such compensation, according to Jackson, results in economically inefficient
reactions, such as increased charges for secured loans, value
transfers from the secured creditor to the estate, and efforts to
avoid these transfers through complex negotiation or precipitous action to foreclose prior to bankruptcy. 49
In developing his analysis, Jackson focuses on a hypothetical creditor fully secured by the liquidation value of the collateral, and generates a judgment allegedly applicable to all cases.
Even if one accepts the underlying premise that a secured
creditor will act rationally to avoid potential economic loss, the
more accurate thrust of Jackson's model is that interest on the
claim may be appropriate in some cases. For example, a creditor who is undersecured in terms of liquidation value may gain
more through reorganization than by receipt of interest since
the value of the property might be enhanced. In such a case,
an economically rational creditor has no incentive to undertake
avoidance reactions. Consequently, there is no potential for adverse effects on general patterns of secured financing as a result of not recognizing "opportunity cost" as an element of
adequate protection.
Jackson's analysis also fails to account for the effect of "opportunity cost" compensation on the ability of the debtor to reorganize. Imposition of these costs through "market pricing"
47. Jackson, supra note 17.
48. Id. at 873.
49. See id. at 875. Based on a review of a limited number of cases, Jackson
purports to examine the "actual operation" of the Code and concludes that "in
actual application it appears that this value-equivalence is consistently undermined." Id. at 872. As will be discussed, however, a closer review of the cases
reveals a substantially more complex pattern than Jackson's assessment suggests. Depending on the type of property involved, courts make substantial efforts to protect the value equivalent of security interests.
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may effectively preclude reorganization in many cases, barring
acknowledged benefits to the estate. In such cases, potentially
adverse effects on secured financing must be balanced against
net economic loss to all creditors. Compensation for opportunity cost is not necessarily the sole or most significant component of this balance. Protection of recoverable value, combined
with other nonfinancial safeguards, may be adequate in at least
some cases, as was suggested by the court in In re South Village, Inc.5 0 In denying compensation for opportunity cost in a
real estate context, the court noted:
Adequate protection is the fulcrum upon which the rights of debtors and creditors are balanced in a reorganization case. Congress knew
that the payment of interest would be an impossible burden for debtors, many of whom ile because of cash shortages....
Congress, however, did not leave creditors unarmed against the attrition ... worked by time. [Various remedies are] tailored to solve
the problem of delay. Adequate protection, which preserves the allowed secured claim and these5 1prophylactics against obstruction in a
case complement one another.

Thus, the purported justification for Jackson's model applies only to selected cases, rather than uniformly to all cases.
Even in these selected cases the basic model is questionable
because it is built on an assumption of economically rational
actors operating to optimize benefits. In such an environment,
market pricing might make secured creditors indifferent to delay of foreclosure. But different behavioral assumptions generate different results; as a result, compensation based on market
pricing may fail to generate the desired indifference and make
avoidance reactions less attractive. Even if the policy goal of
avoiding adverse effects on secured lending is accepted, determination of the appropriate elements of adequate protection requires a model more sensitive to differing behavioral
assumptions.

m. AN OPERATIONAL MODEL
The purpose of an analytical model is either to describe the
current status of the law, or to define a framework that describes what the law should be. In pure form, the two models
of adequate protection discussed above fail on both grounds:
they neither describe the current posture of the law nor develop a thorough analysis of the factors that should be examined to determine adequate protection.
50. 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
51. Id. at 1002.
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To the extent that they seek to define absolute requirements within adequate protection, both the recoverable value
and the opportunity cost models hypothesize artificial constraints not justified by the statutory framework. A focus on recoverable value to the exclusion of other forms of protection
results in an excessive emphasis on maximizing value to the
debtor at the expense of individual creditors and secured
financing in general. This focus is not justified by the statute's
history, which speaks of protecting essential elements of the
bargain, or by its provisions, which recognize indubitable
equivalence as one permissible form of protection. Conversely,
a uniform requirement of compensation for opportunity cost
emphasizes full protection of the secured creditor at the possible expense of seriously impeding reorganization opportunities,
and cannot be justified by a statute that accentuates flexibility
and reorganization.
Neither model adequately describes the various factors actually employed in current case law. While many courts retain
or remove the automatic stay based on findings limited to protection of recoverable value, many others have granted relief
from the stay despite an absence of allegation or proof of a loss
of recoverable value.5 2 Similarly, while numerous courts have
implemented compensation for opportunity cost as an element
of adequate protection,5 3 many others have denied relief from
the stay without compensation for opportunity costs, or have
54
granted relief despite existing mechanisms for compensation.
As a matter of policy and practice, issues of adequate protection are substantially more complex than either model
suggests.
Structuring a more descriptive model initially requires
identification of the underlying points of consensus. For instance, it is clear that imposition and retention of the stay is
not justified unless the subject property has some relation to
52. See, e.g., In re Andrews, 17 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re
Brogden Inv. Co., 22 Bankr. 546 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Caringi, 19 Bankr.
12 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982); In re Kingman Warehouse Co., 17 Bankr. 377 (Bankr.
D. Iowa 1982); In re Hayden Dev. Co., 10 Bankr. 765 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
53. See, e.g., In re Monroe Park, 17 Bankr. 934 (D. Del. 1982); In re Earth
Lite, Inc., 9 Bankr. 440 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Virginia Foundry Co., 9
Bankr. 493 (W.D. Va. 1981); In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
54. See, e.g., Ukranian Say. & Loan v. Trident Corp., 22 Bankr. 491 (E.D. Pa.
1982); In re A & A Transport, Inc., 10 Bankr. 867 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re
American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In re
Kleinsasser, 12 Bankr. 452 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); In re Hutton-Johnson Co., 4
Bankr. 855 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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the potential success of the reorganization. At this level, it is
not necessary that feasibility of reorganization be established.
Rather, the core requirement is simply an elemental connection that is commonly satisfied in business cases.5 5 In addition,
it is equally clear that adequate protection requires, as a basic
element, protection of the recoverable value available to the
creditor. This premise is supported throughout the legislative
history of the Code and is seldom disputed. As a policy matter,
it places a basic limit on the extent to which secured creditors'
interests may be impaired in reorganization proceedings. This
limit may not maximally protect secured creditors, but it does
protect perhaps the most basic component of secured transactions-the ultimate ability to recover from the property-insofar as that right has been preserved prior to bankruptcy.
These elements define a basic core of adequate protection
and establish limiting parameters within which the interests of
the creditor and the estate are balanced. Beyond this core, a
variety of factors must be considered and balanced in the analysis of each case. Pertinent factors include the desirability and
feasibility of compensation for opportunity cost in the particular context. The balancing should not, however, be confined
solely to identifiable financial factors. Instead, upon establishment of core protection, the analysis must focus on balancing
the rights of two entities with conflicting claims to the same
property. The rights of both are qualified rather than absolute.
The objective is to define a contextually optimal balance in recognition of the instant dispute, as well as the potential impact
on broader patterns of secured financing.
The flexible character of adequate protection analysis is
suggested throughout the Code and its legislative history. For
example, section 362(d) broadly provides relief "for cause, including the lack of adequate protection," suggesting that adequate protection is merely a component of a broader concept
5
that explicitly incorporates a relatively open-ended analysis. 6
Similarly, the House committee report concerning section
361 notes:
The... means . . . of providing adequate protection... are neither
exclusive nor exhaustive ....
It is expected that the courts will apply
the concept in light of facts of each case and general equitable principles ....
There are an infinite number of variations possible in dealings between debtors and creditors, the law is continually developing,
55. See infra note 154.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6300.
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The flexibility
and new ideas are continually being implemented ....
is important to permit the courts to adapt to varying circumstances and
57
changing modes of financing.

This equitable analysis requires consideration of two broad
areas. The first involves the characteristics of the loan transaction. The legislative history of the Code indicates that adequate protection is designed to protect the value of the
creditor's bargain. Secured lending, however, is not a unitary
phenomenon; it exists in a variety of contexts involving different forms of risk and reliance. Adequate protection analysis
should reflect this contextual diversity and should also be sensitive to the manner in which the bargain has been performed
prior to bankruptcy.5 8
The second general area involves behavioral considerations
and encompasses the debtor's conduct and current prospects
for reorganization. The right to continued use of the collateral
is neither absolute nor unrelated to overriding objectives. It is
appropriate to review the debtor's behavior toward the creditor
as well as the debtor's apparent purpose in filing for bankruptcy. An element of fair dealing and good faith effort, implicit in an equitable conception of adequate protection, should
guide courts in deciding whether to continue to restrain a creditor. Similarly, courts should examine the likelihood that a
debtor will be able to achieve the objectives that are implicit in
a reorganization case. The extent of this assessment is time related; a prolonged period of restraint requires an increased
likelihood of success.
Thus, the appropriate model entails a fluid assessment of
adequate protection. Such fluidity is necessary to permit
courts to optimize the balance between creditor and debtor in
individual cases. Nevertheless, it also generates substantial
protection of the interests inherent in secured financing. The
core protection of recoverable value establishes a basic minimum protection that is enhanced by sensitivity to behavioral
contexts and particular transactional risks. The ensuing discussion demonstrates that this approach traces the manner in
which courts have examined adequate protection, and establishes a framework to explain and focus the disparate patterns
that have developed in the cases.
57. Id. at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6295.
58. See In re Orlando Coals, Inc., 6 Bankr. 721, 724 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va.
1980) (delayed foreclosure); In re Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr. 679, 682 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1980) (post-default advances).
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COMMERCIAL LENDING

The suggested model for automatic stay litigation involves
a two-level analysis. The first level establishes a baseline protection of recoverable value and ascertains the requisite preliminary connection between retention of the property and the
reorganization effort. The second level involves specification of
the causes for, and the types of, extended adequate protection.
The analysis should differentiate cases on the basis of the type
of transaction, and the behavior and prospects of the parties.
The objective is to reconstruct the secured creditor's bargain in
light of the prevailing equities and the feasibility of
reorganization.
Under this model, one would anticipate substantial differences in the handling of protection issues across the various
types of property financing. Within the context of non-real estate commercial lending, these differences can be seen through
comparison of cases involving equipment financing and cases
involving floating collateral such as inventory and accounts receivable. By focusing on cases within these categories, it becomes apparent that courts are indeed attempting to structure
adequate protection standards in a manner that reflects underlying differences in transactions and in the behavior of the
parties.
A.

EQUIPMENT

Under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the generic term "equipment" encompasses a wide variety of commercial personal property.5 9 The distinguishing characteristic
of "equipment" is that it consists of tangible goods used in a
business, rather than items held for sale or used by a consumer. In terms of the relative durability and value of a single
item, equipment can range from small, short-lived, and inexpensive items to relatively large, durable machines.
Despite this diversity, commercial financing of equipment
is generally associated with heavy equipment of at least several
years normal durability. This generalization clearly applies to
a majority of the reported cases involving equipment finance,
and is significant for the model suggested in this Article since
financing of such equipment is commonly characterized by single payment loans to be repaid from general revenue or resources. From the creditor's perspective, the role of the
59. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (1978).
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collateral in this context approximates traditional notions
about secured lending-a relatively large asset with significant
and somewhat stable value serving as ultimate recourse for the
loan.
1. Core Protection
The core elements of adequate protection consist of
preventing a decrease in recoverable value of the property, and
establishing that the collateral is related to reorganization efforts. In most reported cases dealing with equipment, the requisite connection with the proceeding is apparent and may be
stipulated by the parties. 60 Thus, the central issue in most
cases relates to potential lost value.
Although equipment financing is relatively static in terms
of the debtor's long term use of the collateral, the property is
subject to changes in value over time, typically involving depreciation of property values. When depreciation is established,
unless the creditor is substantially oversecured, there is an immediate and continuing reduction in recoverable value. As a
result, courts recognize that some form of offsetting protection
for depreciation loss is a prerequisite to retaining the automatic
stay.61
Most courts respond to depreciation loss by ordering periodic cash payments to match depreciation rates. 62 Actual payments are necessary because the creditor is typically
undersecured at the time of bankruptcy due to rapid, early depreciation and pre-petition defaults by the debtor. The cash
payment requirement, however, is linked to current depreciation. Courts, appropriately, have not undertaken retroactive
correction of the debt-to-collateral ratio, but have assumed that
adequate protection functions with reference to the creditor's
situation at the time of petition.63 In the few cases in which the
creditor is oversecured, cash payments are unnecessary until
60. Compare In re A & A Transport, Inc., 10 Bankr. 867 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1981) (parties agreed that two tractors subject to creditor's security interest
were "essential" to debtor's operations) and In re Kleinsasser, 12 Bankr. 452
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1981) (parties stipulated that seven trucks subject to creditor's
security interest were necessary to an effective reorganization by debtor) with
In re Farina, 9 Bankr. 726 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (debtor country club failed to
establish that tractor was necessary to its operations).
61. See, e.g., In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 714 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 313, 322 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Kleinsasser, 12 Bankr. 452, 455 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981).
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (Supp. V 1981).
63. See, e.g., In re Wheeler, 12 Bankr. 908, 909 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
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depreciation reduces recoverable value to the point that it
threatens to dip below the size of the obligation. 64
Although depreciation is the major, recurrent threat to recoverable value, depending on the particular type of collateral
involved, courts may emphasize additional factors. For example, in terminating the stay against repossession of strip mining
equipment, the court in In re Champion Coal Co.65 was "influenced by evidence that. . . there is a high risk of major repairs
being required regularly." 66 Absent a proven ability to finance
or compensate for these repairs, the creditor's recoverable
value was exposed to a risk of sudden depletion. 67 Similarly,
in In re ParadiseBoat Leasing Corp.,68 the court terminated
the stay, emphasizing that pleasure boats are "easily destroyed" and that insurance maintained by the debtor did not
69
cover all significant risks of such loss.
2.

Reconstructing the Bargain

The significant feature of the equipment cases is that protection against depreciation or other value loss is the only form
of financial protection required to safeguard the creditor. This
is in marked contrast to the multiple protections found in inventory cases and also differs from the protections adopted in
the reported real estate cases. The unique nature of the protection required in equipment cases is directly attributable to the
relatively static and low risk character of equipment financing,
which delimits the extent to which courts will reconstruct the
essential values of the transaction.
It is undoubtedly true that lenders secured by an interest
in equipment bargain for a cash flow and interest on their investment. These elements of the bargain are indistinguishable
from the bargained-for value of all loan transactions. Unlike
floating lien financing, however, in the equipment context there
is no ongoing interaction between the lender and the debtor's
operations, and there is relatively little risk of loss of the stable
collateral. Absent these factors, the equipment cases stand for
the proposition that cash flow and opportunity cost are not integral, protectable features of the creditor's bargain. In general,
64. See In re Xinde Int'l, Inc., 13 Bankr. 212, 215-16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981);
In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp., 6 Bankr. 463, 466-68 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980).
65. 21 Bankr. 733 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
66. Id. at 735.
67. Id.
68. 2 Bankr. 482 (Bankr. D.V.I. 1979).
69. Id. at 484.
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these elements will be protected only if the debtor gratuitously
offers to do so or, if failure to do so threatens recoverable
70
value.
One might argue that this limited view of the equipment
creditor's bargain is undesirably restrictive. The cases are,
however, relatively uniform on this point. In fact, two of the reported cases wherein opportunity cost is expressly rejected as
an element of adequate protection arose in the equipment context.71 This result was foreshadowed by testimony on the proposed Bankruptcy Code:
The order in most cases... should make provision for compensation to the secured party ....
I think that this would be a relatively
simple provision in the case of machinery and equipment where the
exposure to the creditor could be fairly well determined in advance
and where the risk
to the creditor is ... not that serious, for static as72
sets are involved.

This testimony not only foreshadowed the current treatment of
equipment loans, but also suggests a basis for distinguishing

these transactions with respect to protection of cash flow and
opportunity cost. The relatively slight and predictable risk to
creditors in equipment financing provides a basis for not protecting their interests in cash flow and opportunity cost in this
context.
The equipment cases are also distinguished by the absence
of an analytical tool commonly discussed in real estate cases.
Courts display an apparent tendency in real estate cases to
condition the continuance of a stay, at least in part, on the presence and protection of an equity cushion,7 3 that is, the amount
by which the value of the security exceeds the debt. A significant aspect of the cushion is that it provides a convenient format for accumulation of post-petition interest without any
payments by the debtor.74 Although few equipment cases in70. See In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 714 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1981) (offer of interest converted to compensation of depreciation); In re
Kleinsasser, 12 Bankr. 452, 455 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981) (not entitled to interest); In
re Wheeler, 12 Bankr. 908, 910 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (debtor maintained contract payments); In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp., 6 Bankr. 463, 467-68 (Bankr. S.D. W.
Va. 1980).
71. See In re Kleinsasser, 12 Bankr. 452, 453-55 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); In re
American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 713 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
72. Bankruptcy Reform Act Hearingson S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, pt. 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1976) (statement of Carroll G. Moore,
Chairman, Comm. on Legislation, Nat'l Com. Fin. Conf.).
73. See, e.g., In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981). See also infra text accompanying notes 150-71.
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. V 1981). See also O'Toole, supra note 44,
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volve an existing cushion, there is little indication that the absence of a cushion makes removal of the stay more likely. This
may be due to a reduced impetus to protect opportunity cost in
equipment cases because they typically involve smaller values.
Alternatively, it may relate to the nature of the initiating transaction. Real estate creditors are often able to insist upon and
retain a cushion to ensure full recovery, whereas equipment
lenders are typically unable to do so after initial depreciation
occurs. The differential analysis may also reflect a judgment
that a cushion is a basic element of normal real estate loans,
75
but not equipment loans.
3.

Behavioral Factors

Although financial protections are quite limited in an
equipment setting, the reported cases do not involve a one-dimensional comparison of depreciation to protection offered.
Rather, assuming core protection exists, courts in these cases
are influenced by a variety of factors related primarily to the
behavior and prospects of the debtor. These factors determine
the circumstances in which the equities justify retention of the
stay to allow the debtor an opportunity to reorganize.
In part, these factors relate to the debtor's general conduct
toward the creditor and the collateral, both prior to the filing
and during bankruptcy. In a general equitable analysis of the
respective rights of the parties, the expectation is that the
debtor has dealt with the creditor fairly and in good faith. Unlike cases involving other forms of collateral, 76 none of the
equipment cases involve instances of apparent pre-bankruptcy
fraud or overreaching. In several cases, however, good faith
pre-bankruptcy efforts to repay the outstanding debt worked to
77
the advantage of the debtor. For instance, in In re Wheeler,
the court's willingness to retain a stay was linked in part to the
debtor's prior good record of making payments on the loan,
coupled with a willingness to continue full payments after
filing.78
at 271 (comparing cases supporting and undermining the validity of equity
cushion analysis).
75. See Nimmer, supra note 7, at -.
76. See, e.g., In re Andrews, 17 Bankr. 515, 519 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re
Zed, Inc., 20 Bankr. 462, 464 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Victory Constr. Co., 9
Bankr. 549, 564 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4
Bankr. 635, 637 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
77. 12 Bankr. 908 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
78. But see In re Penn York Mfg., Inc., 14 Bankr. 51, 52 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1981) (stay terminated where debtor had made no payments on debt).
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The advantage to the debtor of good faith dealing with the
creditor continues into the post-filing context. Significantly, a
majority of the cases in which the stay was retained involved
prehearing offers by the debtor to make periodic, compensatory
payments to the creditor.79 In contrast, such offers were infrequent in reported cases in which the stay was terminated.8 0 In
one such case, the offer to pay followed more than one year of
nonpayment.8 1
In part, this pattern is related to the judicial role in adequate protection cases. In contrast to prior law, the legislative
history of the Code indicates that courts have no obligation to
supply adequate protection, but need only evaluate the
debtor's proposals. 82 Thus, where depreciation is proved, termination of the stay is appropriate if the debtor makes no proposal. A number of courts, however, have been willing to
undertake an active role and specify terms of protection.8 3 The
pattern is also connected to traditional equitable concepts,
which should favor debtors who can establish a good faith effort to protect creditors' interests.
Beyond the debtor's protective efforts, courts are also influenced by factors related to the need for retaining the stay and
the feasibility of reorganization efforts.84 One such factor is the
79. See, e.g., In re A & A Transport, Inc., 10 Bankr. 867, 870 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1981); In re Kleinsasser, 12 Bankr. 452, 453 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); In re Wheeler,
12 Bankr. 908, 910 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981). But see In re Champion Coal Co., 21
Bankr. 733, 735-36 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (offer inadequate).
80. See, e.g., In re Farina, 9 Bankr. 726 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); In re Hanson
Dredging, Inc., 6 Bankr. 230 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
81. See In re Penn York Mfg., Inc., 14 Bankr. 51, 52-53 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1981).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 5963, 6295 ('This section does not require the court to
provide [adequate protection]. To do so would place the court in an administrative role.").
83. See, e.g., In re Certified Mortgage Corp., 19 Bankr. 369, 371 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1982); In re Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 313, 321-22 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1982); In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp., 6 Bankr. 463, 468 (Bankr. S.D. W.
Va. 1980); In re Pleasant Valley, Inc., 6 Bankr. 13, 17-18 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980).
This pattern, however, is not universally followed. In some cases, courts
expressly refuse to fashion means of adequate protection where none are proposed by the debtor. See, e.g., In re Ocean State Optical Co., 22 Bankr. 893, 895
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1982). One court has suggested that the willingness to structure
an adequate protection order arises from the informality of the proceedings
and the statutory mandate that the court either terminate or modify the stay
when confronted with inadequate protection. See In re Alyucan Interstate
Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 809 n.12 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). Orders specifying the
terms of adequate protection take the form of modifications conditioning continuation of the stay on compliance with the stated terms.
84. But see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (requiring relief from the
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timing of the request for relief from the stay. In general terms,
the debtor's ability to retain the stay is strongest during the
earliest stages of the case.85 At this point, the desirability of
creating at least an opportunity to reorganize is strongest, and
it may be "premature" to take action that may effectively terminate the case. 86 In contrast, after a more substantial period of
time, the purposes of the stay may have been served and the
creditor's interests may become dominant. 87 Predictably, no
firm time standards apply. Instead, there are contextual variations based on the complexity of the case, the efforts toward reorganization, and whether a reorganization plan has been
proposed.
Closely connected to the timing of the request for relief
from the stay is a court's assessment of the feasibility of eventual reorganization. In equipment cases, this assessment is
typically not contingent on proof of current profitability, although the existence of a current net profit inclines toward retaining the stay. 88 Nor does the assessment commonly involve
a close analysis of markets. Rather, courts typically examine
feasibility in prospective, generalized terms, focusing on the
existence of continuing business activities and some affirmative
effort by the debtor to restructure or streamline operations.89 A
corollary of this analysis weighs the equities against the debtor
where business operations have effectively terminated or
where there is doubt about the debtor's willingness or ability to
operate a business.9 0 For example, in In re Hanson Dredging,
Inc.,91 the court based its termination of a stay against repossession of dredging equipment in part on a finding that the
equipment had not been used for over one year. 92 Such circumstances obviously bear upon both the debtor's need for the
property and the feasibility of its reorganization effort.
stay if there is no equity remaining in the debtor and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization).
85. But see Nimmer, supra note 7, at -.
86. See In re Classic Printers, Inc., 24 Bankr. 24, 25 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
87. See In re Urban Indus., Inc., 22 Bankr. 975, 977 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In
re Penn York Mfg., Inc., 14 Bankr. 51, 53 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981).
88. See, e.g., In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 712 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Xinde Int'l, Inc., 13 Bankr. 212, 215 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
89. See In re Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 313, 319 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1982).
90. See In re Paradise Boat Leasing Corp., 2 Bankr. 482, 484 (Bankr. D.V.I.
1979).
91. 6 Bankr. 230 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
92. Id. at 231.
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B. FLOATING COLLATERAL
In contrast to equipment financing, secured lending with
respect to "floating collateral" is a relatively high risk, high return undertaking. "Floating collateral," for the purposes of this
Article, consists of property that is expected to be sold or otherwise dissipated over a relatively brief time interval. It encom93
passes the U.C.C. categories of "inventory" and "accounts."
Secured transactions involving floating collateral follow a variety of formats. In some cases, the loan is made in one or a few
installments with a pool of floating collateral as security and a
fixed repayment schedule. More commonly, however, the loan
consists of multiple advances keyed to the acquisition of property, with payments to the creditor at least partially dependent
on the sale or other disposition of the property. The loan obligation may be expressed in terms of a maximum aggregate indebtedness secured by property of a specified aggregate value.
Under any of its manifestations, floating lien financing is
particularly dependent on the debtor's good faith and current
profitability. Both parties to such transactions contemplate
from the outset that the collateral pool will be in continual flux
due to sales and acquisitions. In many instances, the creditor's
profit from the loan is substantially dependent on access to proceeds of sales. In any event, the creditor's position may be substantially affected by misjudgments or misrepresentations of
acquisitions or sales. Consequently, most floating lien transactions impose restrictive reporting obligations or inspection
rights. Significant changes, however, may occur over short periods and remain undetected.
1. Core Protection
As with equipment, the central issue in floating lien cases
typically involves protection of recoverable value, rather than
94
establishment of basic need. Depreciation is seldom an issue.
The closest approximation to depreciation is more appropriately characterized as "actual value revealed." For example,
the market value of inventory not sold after a certain period
may decline significantly. Similarly, accounts not collected after a given time may be revealed as uncollectible. Neither ex93. U.C.C. § 9-109(4)

(1978).

94. Issues related to depreciation do arise in connection with items leased
on a periodic basis to third parties. See, e.g., In re Nixon Mach. Co., 9 Bankr.
316, 318 (Bankr.

E.D. Tenn.

309 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980).

1981); In re Kenny Kar Leasing, Inc., 5 Bankr. 304,
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ample, however, typically represents a loss in recoverable value
attributable to a stay against creditor action.
The primary threat to recoverable value in floating collateral cases involves dissipation or consumption of the property,
such as the sale of an item of inventory or the collection of an
account. Typically, the creditor's lien transfers to the proceeds
of these dispositions of the collateral. If the proceeds are cash,
however, the creditor's interest is subject to extinction if the
cash is commingled or used for operational purposes. Absent
affirmative action by the parties or the court, the security interest does not extend to inventory or accounts acquired after the
95
bankruptcy filing.
The extreme volatility of floating collateral defines a basic
element of the risk in this form of financing. The risk that the
creditor's position is subject to rapid change is recognized by
the Code. An early draft of the Code contained a provision precluding the use or sale of "soft collateral" without prior court
authorization, or consent of the secured creditor.9 6 "Soft collateral" included inventory, accounts, and cash. The provision
was intended to safeguard the creditor against rapid, post-filing
changes in the debtor's position until judicial protection could
be implemented. Because this broad provision could have substantially and excessively disrupted the debtor's post-petition
business operation, the final form of the Code was modified to
permit debtors to use inventory and accounts in the ordinary
course of business without a court order, but also to require authorization or consent for the use of "cash collateral."9 7 The effect of this provision has been to force very early decisions on
use of cash collateral in inventory cases.98 Generally, at least
in the reported cases, courts have authorized use of cash collateral subject to various restrictions.
In the typical case, the core elements of adequate protection cannot be provided through cash payments. For example,
in an inventory case, the proceeds of sales of inventory represent the primary cash flow to support business operations. Particularly where the cash position of the debtor consists almost
entirely of cash from encumbered inventory, a protective order
turning these proceeds over to the creditor in one-for-one com95. See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1981). See also In re Karl A. Niese, Inc., 16
Bankr. 600, 602 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
96. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5841.
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 136-42.
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pensation for loss would eventually close down the business.
Although cash payments are commonly required in inventory
cases, they serve other functions and are not calibrated to compensate for lost value due to sale.
Instead, the primary method of preserving the creditor's
value position involves the imposition of replenishment requirements. For example, in In re Karl A. Niese, Inc. ,99 the net
value of inventory was increasing due to the use of unencumbered cash for purchases. The court found adequate protection
in the form of a security interest in the newly acquired inventory. 0 0 Similarly, in several cases adequate protection orders
contain requirements that the debtor maintain inventory or accounts at a specified value level.l 0 This form of protection
tracks the character of the underlying transaction. The floating
lien creditor does not typically rely on a single item of property,
but relies instead on an aggregate pool of property that, almost
by definition, is constantly changing as to particular items. In
bankruptcy, however, this form of protection often requires an
express grant of a replacement lien on subsequently-acquired
property, since the Code provides that the typical after-acquired property clause in an inventory agreement is ineffective
after filing.102 In the absence of an express grant, the creditor
has no claim to this property unless it can be established that
the new items are proceeds of the original collateral.
As to basic protections, a similar pattern prevails in cases
involving the use of cash proceeds derived from the sale of encumbered inventory or collection of encumbered accounts. In
cases in which the debtor is able to pay operating expenses
from unencumbered property, no particular difficulty arises.
Depending on the debtor's sales volume and profit margin, the
creditor receives core protection if the proceeds are used to ob03
tain replacement property in equivalent or greater amounts.
More typically, however, the entire invento~y is encumbered
and a portion of the cash proceeds must be used to cover basic
operating expenses. In such situations, the initial reaction is
that the creditor's net position will decline. Such decline, however, is not inevitable.
99. 16 Bankr. 600 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
100. Id. at 601-02.
101. See In re Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 Bankr. 720, 722 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1982); In re Potvin Lumber Co., 24 Bankr. 54, 56 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982).
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1981).
103. See In re Charay Indus., Inc., 23 Bankr. 988, 997 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1982).
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An illustration of this circumstance arose in In re Jim Kelly
Ford, Ltd. ,104 where the creditor was secured by an interest in
inventory and in a cash account. The issue was whether the
debtor could withdraw funds from the account to cover necessary operating expenses. The lower court permitted the debtor
to use the funds, concluding that the creditor would receive a
net benefit from the resulting ordinary course sales because of
the debtor's ability to cover operating expenses.1 05 The district
court affirmed this conclusion, holding that the creditor could
be adequately protected by the anticipated gain from the sales,
even though there was no anticipated net profit. The court explained the financial aspect of its decision as follows:
[The] assets in which Ford Credit had a security interest before Judge
Eisen's order comprised the Fund and the automobile inventory, the
latter having a value equal to 75% of Kelly Ford's cost. So long as the
diminution in the value of the Fund .. . is matched by an enhancement in the value of the other asset-that is by an increase in the realization from sales of the automobile inventory over the 75% figureFord will have received "adequate protection" in the form of the "indu106
bitable equivalent" called for by the Code.

As the court's analysis suggests, adequate protection of a current cash fund is commonly not viewed in isolation from other
collateral, at least not in a floating collateral context. Rather,
the interaction between the various forms of collateral, such as
inventory, accounts, and cash, is recognized. If the creditor's
interest encompasses several different accounts, the net change
over all collateral is the relevant issue, rather than the change
in one particular pool of assets.
Although this form of core protection is conceptually
sound, it entails substantially greater risk than is involved in
equipment cases, especially where the proceeds of the collateral are used in part to pay the debtor's operational expenses.
For example, in order to find adequate core protection, the
court in Jim Kelly Ford had to determine that the projected retail sale price (ninety-three percent of cost) sufficiently exceeded the current value of the collateral (seventy-five percent
of cost) to cover the costs of operation. 0 7 Similar projections
are common in floating lien cases, including those that involve
direct replacement of inventory as it is sold.108 These projec104. 14 Bankr. 812 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
105. Id. at 815.
106. Id. at 818 n.3.
107. See id. at 818.
108. The risk is less extreme where inventory is being replenished in part
by supplemental funds from the debtor, or where the proceeds of sale are not
used to finance operations. See, e.g., In re Charay Indus., Inc., 23 Bankr. 988, 997
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tions and estimations are contingent on a number of market
factors and are subject to significant error that might be detrimental to the creditor's position. Such risks are, of course, inherent in the nature of the original loan transaction. Extending
these risks into the bankruptcy context is essential to ensure
the debtor an opportunity to reorganize, and is justified by the
character of the risk that the creditor originally assumed
outside of bankruptcy.
2.

Reconstructing the Bargain

As previously indicated, judicial efforts to reconstruct the
original bargain in equipment cases are substantially limited;
adequate protection in financial terms involves little more than
core compensation for depreciation of property value. In contrast, floating collateral cases routinely involve substantial reconstruction of the original bargain, due in large part to a
general tendency on the part of courts to compensate for the
extra risk encountered by the creditor. Compensation commonly includes payment of interest on the enforced investment
and maintenance of at least some cash flow to the creditor. Although not necessarily required by the statutory emphasis on
protection, this greater emphasis on reconstructing the original
bargain is justified by the substantial risks to the creditor.
Consideration of judicial reconstruction of floating lien bargains requires an initial concentration on issues of collateral
valuation. The typical inventory finance arrangement illustrates that a single item of property may have several values
depending on the market in which sale is anticipated. For purposes of this discussion, it will be sufficient to focus on three
alternative measures: liquidation value (forced sale price),
wholesale value, and retail value. In a normal retail operation,
the debtor-merchant derives its profit from the difference between its cost (usually wholesale value) and the price at which
it sells the property (usually retail value), minus any overhead,
operating, or financing costs. Similarly, the creditor's profit and
secured position will be derived largely from this same differential, especially where the creditor is financing the entire inventory of the debtor. The property is typically financed at a
percentage of the dealer's acquisition cost and payments are
based on a schedule related to retail operations. In essence,
the transaction is a contingent joint venture in which the posi(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Karl A. Niese, Inc., 16 Bankr. 600, 601 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1981).
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tion of both parties is affected by the debtor's current ability to
sell at a profit.109
In bankruptcy, this transactional form creates significant
conceptual problems in deriving a standard of valuation to be
applied to the inventory in any particular context. The Code
expressly declines to resolve this question through a uniform
rule. Instead, section 506 of the Code merely provides that
property valuation is to be made in light of the "purpose of the
valuation and the proposed disposition or use of such property."" 0 A valuation standard used for one purpose need not
necessarily control subsequent valuations made for different
purposes. This statutory language provides inadequate guidance. In the typical inventory case the debtor proposes to dispose of the property at retail or wholesale prices. In contrast, if
allowed to foreclose, the creditor will commonly dispose of the
property wholesale or through a liquidation auction. Depending on the market and the type of collateral, the difference between liquidation and retail value may be as high as twohundred percent, even assuming commercially reasonable
behavior.
This differential has led to substantial controversy. An earlier draft of the Bankruptcy Code proposed uniform use of liquidation value with reference to automatic stay issues. 1 This
proposal was rejected, however, and replaced by the language
in section 506(a) quoted above. The congressional reports indicate that the choice of a valuation standard should be made on
a case-by-case basis:
[It is not] expected that the courts will construe the term value to
mean, in every case, forced sale liquidation value or full going concern
value .... In any particular case, especially a reorganization case, the

determination of which entity should be entitled to the difference bebe based
tween the going concern value and the liquidation value must
112
on equitable considerations based on the facts of the case.

Predictably, the creditor community is strongly supportive of a
going concern or retail valuation of inventory.113 Doctrinal support for this position derives largely from the pre-Code, inventory case of In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc. ,114 in which the
109. As will be discussed below, this relationship leads to an emphasis on
current profitability in floating lien cases. See infra text accompanying notes
142-48.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. V 1981).
111. See COanMUssION REPORT, supra note 28, pt. I, at 237.
112. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 5963, 6295.
113. See Murphy, supra note 31, at 1509.
114. 2 BANKR.CT. DEC. (CRR) 715 (Bankr. D. Me. 1976).
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court purported to rely on U.C.C. default provisions to resolve
the disparity between the value of the property to the debtor
based on its proposed use and the value of the property to the
creditor based on its most likely sale. The U.C.C. requires that
foreclosure sales be conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner.11 5 The court contrasted this standard to liquidation
sales and concluded that not only was a liquidation standard
inappropriate, but the appropriate standard should reflect the
most commercially reasonable sale:
Where the collateral is used or produced ... by a going business
which offers reasonable prospects that it can continue, the value of the
collateral is equatable with the net recovery realizable from its disposition as near as may be in the ordinary course of business....
[Conversion] in the ordinary course of business should be considered the most commercially reasonable disposition,
simply because
116
and to the extent that it is more productive.

At least one court has applied a retail valuation in automatic
7
stay litigation in accord with this reasoning."1
American Kitchen Foods represents an interesting inversion of the U.C.C. standard. The U.C.C. provision establishes a
minimum standard of fair conduct by creditors in order to protect debtors against unreasonably low sales of property after
foreclosure."18 American Kitchen Foods, however, inverts this
standard, establishing criteria that presume a maximal effort,
resulting in a valuation standard that substantially restricts
debtors and benefits creditors. Under a retail valuation, the
debtor, unless buttressed by substantial cash reserves, is exposed to risk of loss of the collateral due to unavoidable and
unexpected declines in the retail market for the current
inventory.
A more basic flaw in applying a retail valuation standard
(or the equivalent if the debtor is a wholesaler) is that the
standard fails to reflect the actual basis on which the transaction was built. In most cases, a lender secured by floating collateral does not advance money based on the anticipated retail
sale price. Rather, such loans are normally based on discounts
from the debtor's acquisition cost. Wholesale valuation is implicit in a transaction that depends on profit margin to generate
income for both parties. Where it forms the underlying basis of
115. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978).
116. American Kitchen Foods,Inc., 2 BAY-. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 721-22.

117. See In re QPL Components, 20 Bankr. 342, 346 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
118. See generally Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings
Under the UCC, 47 MimN. L REv. 205, 220-29 (1962); Comment, CommercialReasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 33 TENN. L REV. 211 (1965).
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the transaction, wholesale valuation should be used to determine adequate protection:
Going concern value does not mean that in eschewing liquidation value
one must rely upon retail prices rather than wholesale prices. Surely
an institutional financier of automobiles at 100% of the wholesale cost
should be entitled to rely upon the wholesale prices of the vehicles
since the secured creditor is not in the business of retailing the vehicles and is not expected to derive full retail value upon foreclosure. 1 19

Utilization of a wholesale valuation standard results in a reconstructed bargain that approximates the original agreement.
Obviously, the total of all collateral, including cash, accounts,
and inventory, will fluctuate as "wholesale" property is sold at
"retail" prices and operating expenses or replacement costs are
paid. This fluctuation does not necessarily impede protection
of the creditor's initial position, however, and is bargained for
by the parties.
Regardless of the valuation standard, the crux of a floating
lien transaction consists of the difference between the costs of
acquisition and sale, and the price or value received. This
profit margin has obvious significance to both the debtor and
the creditor. It is obtained, however, at a significant risk to the
creditor in both the initiating transaction and the adequate protection context. Based substantially on this risk element,
courts generally do not restrict the creditor's adequate protection to merely a projected maintenance of the status quo. Instead, courts compensate the creditor for this inherent risk by
at least partial reimbursement of opportunity cost, and by a requirement that the debtor maintain a cash flow of payments or
other value transfers to the creditor as a condition for retaining
the stay.
Although the view that floating lien cases require a more
complete reconstruction of the creditor's bargain is virtually
universally held, it is generally implicit in the court's approach
to the case, rather than explicitly stated in terms of a doctrinal
holding that inventory cases should be handled differently than
equipment cases. 120 Some form of payment to the creditor is
119. In re Thomas Parker Enters., Inc., 10 Bankr. 783, 788 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981). See also In re Jim Kelly Ford, Ltd., 14 Bankr. 812, 818 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
120. Notably, two of the cases often cited for the premise that interest payments are required for adequate protection arose in a floating lien context. See
In re Virginia Foundry Co., 9 Bankr. 493 (W.D. Va. 1981); In re Anchorage Boat
Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980). None of the floating lien cases
expressly reject the inclusion of interest within adequate protection. In contrast, a major case rejecting interest as an element of protection arose in an
equipment context. See In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 71213 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). Arguably, although courts state their respective con-
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required in roughly seventy-five percent of the floating lien
cases in which the stay is retained. These payments are generally not designed to offset anticipated reductions in collateral
value. The payments are typically coupled with a requirement
that the debtor maintain a stable aggregate inventory value.12 1
Where payments are not required, the stay is generally retained only upon a showing that the creditor's position is likely
to improve through continued "use" of the inventory-another
example of profit compensating for risk122 Similarly, in cases
in which the stay is vacated, the common fact pattern is that no
payments are offered to the creditor and no vehicle exists to establish that the creditor will profit from the operations of the
debtor.123 For example, in In re Thomas Parker Enterprises,
Inc.,124 the court vacated the stay in part because the debtor
was unable to offset accruing interest on the claim. Post-petition interest was not required under the Code, however, since
there was no excess collateral value.
In the context of inventory or accounts, the requirement of
periodic transfers to the creditor is independent of the availability of an equity cushion to protect the creditor's initial position during the early stages of the case. For example, in In re
Earth Lite, Inc.,125 the court required payments although the
collateral substantially exceeded the outstanding balance of
the claim. For several months after filing, the debtor had used
cash, inventory, and accounts under a post-filing agreement requiring the debtor to make periodic cash payments on principal
and interest. When the debtor defaulted on this agreement, the
creditor sought to enjoin the debtor's continued use of the
property. The debtor argued that the creditor was adequately
protected as a result of a substantial "equity cushion" which
would protect the creditor's secured position notwithstanding
clusions in general terms, the doctrinal result in these cases is conditioned by
the type of collateral involved. The cases involving real estate split on this issue. Compare In re Monroe Park, 17 Bankr. 934, 941 (D. Del. 1982) (interest
award appropriate) with In re South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987, 990 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982) (mortgagee not entitled to interest).
121. See, e.g., In re Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 Bankr. 720, 722
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Heatron, Inc., 6 Bankr. 493, 497 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.

1980).
122. See In re Karl A. Niese, Inc., 16 Bankr. 600, 602 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981);
In re Jim Kelly Ford, Ltd., 14 Bankr. 812 (N.D. Ill. 1980). But see In re Sel-ORak Corp., 24 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
123. See In re Ocean State Optical Co., 22 Bankr. 893, 895 (Bankr. D.R.L
1982); In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635, 642-43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.

1980).
124. 10 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
125. 9 Bankr. 440 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
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some decrease in property value. 126 Focusing on the cash collateral, the court rejected this claim and ordered the debtor to
resume monthly payments:
[Thel Debtor should not be permitted to use cash collateral without
making some payments to the secured party just because it has . .. a
meaningful equity cushion in the collateral. To accept this proposition
would mean that a debtor may freely use cash collateral until the collateral is reduced to the amount of indebtedness during which time the
secured party is deprived
of income, for which it bargained when the
127
loan was granted.

Thus, the requirement of periodic payments is not tied to or delimited by a net reduction in the value of the collateral. Indeed,
in Earth Lite, the payments had resulted in a substantial reduction of the outstanding claim with no proven reduction in
collateral.
The requirement of payments and compensation for interest can be viewed as compensation for, and profit from, the
substantial risk the creditor undertook and continues to assume. In this manner, courts are making extensive efforts to
reconstruct the full value of the original agreement. In a typical floating lien agreement, there is a continuing interaction between disbursements and payments. In bankruptcy, the
disbursements have terminated, except insofar as the debtor
has the right to sell inventory and retain the proceeds. 128 The
exercise of that right by the debtor and the risk it entails justify
compensation analogous to that bargained for in the original
agreement. In cases where payments are required, the computational formula varies. Often, the debtor is required to make
periodic payments in specified amounts directly linked to
agreements encompassing repayment of both principal and interest. 129 In other cases, the debtor must pay the creditor a
percentage of proceeds. 130 In all cases, however, the assumption is that the creditor has a right to participate in the profit
realized by use of its collateral.
In addition to cash payments, courts generally impose additional restraints on the debtor in order to provide protection.
For instance, the debtor may be required to make periodic reports summarizing property and cash flow attributable to con126. Id. at 443.
127. Id. at 444.
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
129. See, e.g., In re Earth Lite, Inc., 9 Bankr. 440, 444 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981);
In re Anderson-Walker Indus., Inc., 3 Bankr. 551, 552 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980); In
re Heatron, Inc., 6 Bankr. 493, 497 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
130. See In re QPL Components, Inc., 20 Bankr. 342, 346 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Cormarc, Inc., 16 Bankr. 551, 553 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
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tinued use of the collateral. 13 1 This report and monitoring
requirement directly tracks a common element of inventory
financing and represents yet another aspect of reconstructing
the original bargain. Due to the rapid conversion of individual
items, a process of reporting and inspection is integral to ensuring maintenance of the creditor's actual position.
3.

Behavioral Factors

As the foregoing discussion indicates, courts require the
creditor to retain relatively substantial risks inherent in transactions in which floating collateral is utilized, but compensate
for such risks by establishing relatively elaborate protective
constraints that substantially reconstruct the original bargain.
Within this context, many of the reported cases might be described as being resolved solely within the parameters of
financial protections. Actually, however, as in equipment cases,
behavioral, timing, and operational considerations also have a
significant role.
These factors are analogous to those noted with reference
to equipment lenders. For example, demonstrable efforts to
protect the creditor's position and repay the debt tend to augment the debtor's position in automatic stay cases. This is true
whether the efforts occur before or after the bankruptcy
filing.132 In contrast, if the debtor displays apparent indifference to the creditor's interests, courts tend toward vacating the
stay without any effort to interpose orders requiring
33
protection.1
One pattern that is not encountered in the equipment setting involves debtor misconduct with respect to the loan collateral and collections. As noted previously, in a floating lien
arrangement in which the creditor makes advances based on
new acquisitions and receives payments upon sales, substantial
reliance is placed on accurate reporting and monitoring of inventory transactions. In some cases, through negligence or
fraud, inaccurate data can lead to the creditor's position being
131. See, e.g., In re Potvin Lumber Co., 24 Bankr. 54, 56 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982);
In re Heatron, Inc., 6 Bankr. 493, 496-97 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
132. See In re Earth Lite, Inc., 9 Bankr. 440, 441 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981)
(post-petition agreement reducing debt); In re Karl A. Niese, Inc., 16 Bankr.
600, 601 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (post-petition use of cash to increase inventory);
In re Anderson-Walker Indus., Inc., 3 Bankr. 551, 552 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980)
(offer to make note payments).
133. See, e.g., In re Ocean State Optical Co., 22 Bankr. 893, 895 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1982).
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substantially changed without the creditor's knowledge. When
this occurs prior to or during a bankruptcy case, it has an obvious impact on the debtor, who is essentially arguing for an equitable right to retain the property and continue to expose the
creditor to risk. The debtor's position was accurately described
by the court in In re Lackow Brothers, Inc.:134
[The] Court's decision is also influenced by evidence of misconduct on
the part of the Debtor which was tantamount to fraud and which resulted in substantial injury to [the creditor]. Briefly, it appears that
the Debtor induced [the creditor] to advance moneys . . . based on a
representation that.., goods had been shipped ... when most of the
goods had not in fact been shipped ....
Suffice to say, in view of the Debtor's history of misconduct and
flagrant violation of rights conferred on [the creditor] by its security
agreements, an arrangement whereby the Debtor obtained unfettered
use of any portion of its inventory or accounts receivable pledged to
could not fairly be said to afford [the creditor] adequate
[the creditor]
135
protection.
36
In the absence of an operational management change,1 the
impact of misconduct is apparent. The debtor claims an equitable right to retain the property and continue in business. To
qualify for this right, the debtor must at least have acted in
good faith toward the creditor. In the presence of fraudulent
misconduct, the creditor's risk escalates and the equitable right
evaporates.
Although allegations of misconduct arise in the floating lien
context, in most cases there has been no provable fraud. In
such instances, courts are responsive to less dramatic aspects
of the factual context. With respect to these factors, however,
characteristics of the transaction and of the Code alter the emphasis applied in floating collateral cases.
An initial consideration is the stage in the case at which
the adequate protection issue is raised. As in equipment cases,
the debtor's position weakens as the proceeding matures. In
floating lien cases, however, the timing is substantially truncated by a Code provision that prohibits the use of cash collateral without court authorization.137 When coupled with an
understandable desire by creditors to obtain early protection
of, or access to, volatile property, this provision forces critical
decisions on inventory, accounts, and cash into very early

134. 10 Bankr. 717 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
135. Id. at 720. See also In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635, 640
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
136. See, e.g., In re QPL Components, Inc., 20 Bankr. 342, 345 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1982).
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (2) (Supp. V 1981).
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stages of the proceeding. In most of the reported decisions,
courts ruled on this issue within seven months of the filing of
the petition. In a majority of cases, a ruling was made within
3
three months.1 8
This pattern is most pronounced in cases dealing with the
use of cash collateral, where it is not uncommon for a court to
reach a decision on at least a preliminary basis within days of
the filing.13 9 Such promptness benefits the creditor to the extent that it imposes protective review very early in the process,
but it also inclines the court toward decisions that at least temporarily allow the debtor to use the collateral and remain in
operation.
The court's analysis in In re Heatron, Inc. 140 illustrates the
influence of this truncated time frame. In Heatron, a decision
on the use of cash collateral was rendered approximately one
month after the petition was filed. The court acknowledged
that there was "no question" that use of the cash was essential
for the debtor to continue doing business.1 41 While the debtor
argued that adequate protection could be found in excess collateral value and anticipated replenishment, there was considerable dispute as to the amount and value of the collateral, as
well as to the debtor's business prospects. Faced with these
disputes, the court allowed the debtor to use the cash,
reasoning
The Court is not obligated to protect the creditor better than it did itself when making the loan and obtaining security. At the same time,
the Court cannot allow the security to be diminished. The policy of the
Code ... is to encourage reorganization if there is a reasonable possibility of success. At the beginning of the reorganization process, the
Court must work with less evidence than might be desirable and
should resolve issues in favor of the reorganization, where the evidence
is conflicting.
Here, while there are disputes as to the value of the security,
[there are] values in excess of the debt, although not ... a comfortable amount. It is incumbant upon the Court, therefore, to make specific
requirements... to insure ... adequate protection. 1 4 2
138. See, e.g., In re QPL Components, Inc., 20 Bankr. 342 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Thomas Parker Enters., Inc., 10 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981);
In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
139. See In re Sel-O-Rak Corp., 24 Bankr. 5, 5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (two
weeks); In re Anderson-Walker Indus., Inc., 3 Bankr. 551, 552 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1980) (one week); In re Heatron, Inc., 6 Bankr. 493, 495 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980)
(one month).
140. 6 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
141. Id. at 495.
142. Id. at 496 (citations omitted). In the absence of adequate protective efforts, however, there is no statutory or equitable right to a "breathing spell." In
re Ocean State Optical Co., 22 Bankr. 893, 895 (Bankr. D.R.L 1982). But see In re
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The court required weekly reports, monthly proof that inventory was being replenished, and weekly payments of principal
43
and interest.1
The dilemma noted in Heatron arises in all similar cases
where the court reaches an early decision. The basic policies of
section 362 and Chapter 11 indicate that a business debtor
should have an opportunity to reorganize. An early, negative
decision on use of the collateral may effectively terminate the
debtor's business before there is any realistic opportunity to reorganize. But the Code also requires that adequate protection
be constructed in this typically complex transactional setting.
Often, the result is a decision favorable to the debtor, subject to
significant restrictions. The decision may later be reversed at a
final hearing on use of the collateral, or on general relief from
the stay, when a more complete view of the debtor's prospects
is available.14 4
The emphasis of floating collateral cases differs from that
of equipment cases with regard to consideration of the debtor's
current profitability and prospects for successful reorganization. Feasibility of eventual reorganization is the essential rationale for reorganization cases; if there is no likelihood of
success, the process of continued restraint on the creditor becomes meaningless and unnecessarily harmful. In equipment
cases, feasibility is generally examined with reference to future
prospects not necessarily linked to current profitability. This is
consistent with the relatively stable and durable character of
the asset. In contrast, in floating lien cases there is greater emphasis on current profitability. 145 This orientation is consistent
not only with the nature of the collateral, but also with the essential structure of adequate protection in floating lien cases,
which depends on a current profit margin to support replenishment of property and compensation for use.
Since the issue of adequate protection is most often raised
shortly after the bankruptcy filing, a substantial burden is imposed on the debtor, and a rapid response to pre-bankruptcy
conditions may be required. As a result, profitability is not
Discount Wallpaper Center, Inc., 19 Bankr. 221, 222 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982)
(short period of time granted).
143. Heatron, 6 Bankr. at 497.
144. Compare In re Thomas Parker Enters., Inc., 8 Bankr. 207 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1981) (debtor granted conditional use of collateral) with In re Thomas
Parker Enters., Inc., 10 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (stay terminated).
145. See In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635, 643 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.

1980).
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closely examined in all cases. Furthermore, when profitability
is examined, the focus should be on net income above operating expenses, excluding maintenance of unsecured debt obligations. Unsecured debt is not required to be kept current after
the case is filed; nor are unsecured creditors entitled to adequate protection. Creditors will derive benefit from successful
completion of the case, and their remedy, if necessary to avoid
aggravated loss, lies in motions to dismiss or convert the case.
Current profit, defined as net income above operating costs,
or at least a break-even level of income is critical to the floating
collateral creditor and is viewed as such by the courts. For example, in In re Thomas Parker Enterprises,Inc. ,146 during the
five months between filing and removal of the stay, current income did not meet operating expenses, resulting in a net
loss.147 Arguably, net loss can be temporarily sustained and
covered if there is a surplus of collateral value at the outset. In
such a case, without adversely affecting the creditor, the debtor
has an opportunity to reduce operating expenses, or otherwise
improve profitability, while maintaining compensatory payments. Without such surplus, however, the adverse effect on
the creditor is immediate.
A different situation necessarily arises where the debtor's
operations are currently profitable under the above definition,
or where there are clear indications of a turn in that direction
in the immediate future. For example, in In re Charay Industries, Inc.,148 the court, in reaching a decision favorable to the
debtor, was strongly influenced b a large net profit experienced by the debtor during the case which tended to ensure
adequate replenishment of the collateral. In Charay, a prior
history of profitability had been interrupted by a short-term
drop in sales which had been overcome during the case.149
Similarly, in In re Sel-O-Rak Corp.,150 financial difficulties
caused by aborted expansion plans were apparently sufficiently
overcome to project relatively immediate profitability.151
C. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
Commercial real estate lending involves a variety of forms
146. 10 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
nificant

Id. at 785.
23 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982).
See id. at 998.
24 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
See id. at 6. In Sel-O-Rak, the creditor was further protected by a sigcushion of excess collateral value.
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encompassing different levels of risk and integration with the
debtor's business. While several reported cases involve on-going construction loans or specialized loan formats, the vast majority of cases deal with single installment loans with relatively
fixed repayment schedules. These latter cases will be the focus
of the ensuing discussion.
Characterized by a relatively large investment connected to
a substantial and relatively stable asset, real estate lending resembles equipment financing more than it does floating collateral financing. The real estate lender typically does not
establish direct reliance on, or connection to, the debtor's current income, as occurs in the floating collateral context. Instead, the more significant reliance of the real estate creditor is
on the current and future value of the secured asset itself.
Despite similarities, a number of features of traditional real
estate lending distinguish it from equipment financing. Foremost, the value of the typical commercial real estate loan, at
least in the reported bankruptcy cases, is significantly greater
than that encountered in equipment financing. This is an average rather than an absolute difference, as there are obviously a
number of equipment loans of significant value. In the reported real estate cases, however, loan amounts substantially
in excess of one million dollars are common, while they are
much less frequent in equipment cases. 5 2 The large dollar
value of the loan obviously shapes the perceived interest of the
creditor in terms of eventual recovery as well as current income on investment.
The size of the investment and the nature of the collateral
contribute to a second differentiating feature of real estate
loans. While short term loans are encountered, especially in
secondary financing, the typical real estate mortgage is a relatively long term instrument. This long term orientation is supportable due to the stable or incrementing value of the
collateral. While equipment lending involves depreciating as152. Compare In re Selby Farms, Inc., 15 Bankr. 372, 373 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
1981) (real estate loan in excess of $3,000,000) and In re Pleasant Valley, 6
Bankr. 13, 14 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980) (real estate loan of $4,925,000) and In re San
Clemente Estates, 5 Bankr. 605, 606 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (creditor committed
to loan up to $5,350,000 to develop real estate) and In re Stuart Motel, Inc., 8
Bankr. 50, 51 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (real estate loan in excess of $1,000,000)
with In re A & A Transport, Inc., 10 Bankr. 867, 868 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (debt
of approximately $24,000 on two trucks) and In re American Mariner Indus.,
Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 712 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (debt secured by machinery,
equipment, tools, etc., valued at $110,000) and In re Wheeler, 12 Bankr. 908, 909
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (approximately $49,000 owed on log skidder).
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sets with relatively short useful lives, depreciation in real estate relates solely to improvements on the property, leaving
substantial land values which in recent history have increased
over time. As a result, the overall collateral value may improve
over the span of even a long term loan.
Given the stable value of real estate and likely large investment involved, real estate lenders are often able to insist upon
and maintain an equity cushion of excess property value to ensure recovery of their loans. Loans are often made at a percentage of the acquisition cost of the property unless they are
designed to support construction or conversion of improvements. The cushion established may vary depending on the existing status of the property. Thus, for example, a greater
percentage of excess value would be required for raw land than
for improved real estate. Since property values do not deteriorate rapidly, payment schedules can often maintain this cushion over the life of the loan.
1.

Core Protection

In the context of equipment and inventory loans, core protection of recoverable value to the creditor is a significant issue
in virtually every case due to depreciation or consumption of
the property. In contrast, in the reported real estate cases,
courts seldom raise the issue of a decline in the actual value of
the collateral. In a few cases, market value declines are alleged, but it is equally common that the property is appreciating in value. 153 The risk that improvements will be destroyed
or damaged by unexpected events is typically covered by requirements that the debtor maintain insurance.
The most common, albeit relatively rare, form of threat to
recoverable value involves multiple creditor cases in which the
creditor seeking protection is a junior lienholder. The senior
liens may be prior mortgages or accruing tax liens. In the case
of a senior mortgage, since the senior lender is typically oversecured, interest on its claim accrues under section 506.154 This
interest adds to the senior debt and may force the junior creditor into an increasingly undersecured position, effectively reducing the recoverable value of the property to the junior
153. See In re Boca Dev. Assocs., 21 Bankr. 624, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982);
In re Certified Mortgage Co., 17 Bankr. 225, 226 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re

Pleasant Valley, Inc., 6 Bankr. 13, 17 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980); In re Rogers Dev.
Corp., 2 Bankr. 679, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. V 1981).
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creditor. In such cases, courts typically respond by requiring
the debtor to pay interest to the senior lienholder or to make
compensatory payments to the junior claimant based on the
rate of increase in senior claims.155
The second core issue involves the debtor's need for the
property. This issue, as it applies to real estate cases, received
substantial attention in the development of the current Code.
As proposed by the Senate, the Code required that a stay be
terminated if the debtor lacked an equity interest and the property was not necessary to the reorganization. This requirement
was buttressed by a statutory presumption that the property
was not necessary if it was "real property on which no business
is being conducted other than operating the real property and
activities incidental thereto."' 56 The objective was to eliminate
bankruptcy abuses associated with highly leveraged, tax shelter investments. Although the "no equity" test was retained as
a ground for relief from a stay, the statutory presumption was
deleted from the final draft of the Code.17
Although the resulting standard plays a role in real estate
cases, the question of need for the property is seldom controversial in business cases. Instead, the courts have generally
adopted a "debtor-centered" interpretation of need. Under this
view, the debtor is able to determine whether to continue to
use the property and to select from several parcels of real estate those which will be retained.158 The question of need is
primarily an issue in consumer cases under Chapter 13 and
section 362(d) (2) of the Code.159
2.

Reconstructing the Bargain

In a context where core protection is seldom a major issue,
the decisional process concentrates on issues related to rebuilding the initial bargain and balancing behavioral factors.
155. See, e.g., In re American Properties, Inc., 8 Bankr. 68, 72 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1980).
156. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 5787, 5838-39.
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2) (Supp. V 1981).
158. See Nimmer, supra note 7 at -.
See also In re Mickler, 13 Bankr. 631,
633 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
159. In Chapter 13 actions, relatively stringent standards of need are often
applied with emphasis on absolute need or benefit as contrasted to mere convenience. See In re Rodebaugh, 12 Bankr. 81, 82 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); In re
Roselli, 10 Bankr. 665, 667 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Suter, 10 Bankr. 471, 472
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). Compare In re Sulzer, 2 Bankr. 630, 634-35 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Chapter 11) with In re Garner, 18 Bankr. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (Chapter 13).
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With reference to the creditor's bargain, the primary emphasis
has been on the presence or absence of an equity cushion and
on the creditor's right to receive interest on its typically substantial investment.
The idea of an "equity cushion" that relates to adequate
protection of a real estate creditor was first stated in In re
PittS,16o

a case arising under Chapter 13. In retaining the stay

against foreclosure of a residential mortgage, the court in Pitts
noted:
The existence of an equity [cushion], in terms of collateral value in excess of the secured creditor's claim, is an elementary and fundamental
part of the transaction. True, the secured creditor assumes the risk
that default and sale may occur at a time when the market is depressed so that foreclosure and sale may not ... pay the claim. However, to deprive the secured creditor of the right to proceed with
foreclosure at a time when a cushion exists and to compel postponement of his remedy in the face of a clearly foreseeable possibility that
the cushion may disappear, is to expose the secured creditor to risks
16 1
which were not part of the bargain.

Describing the existing cushion as "minimal," the court retained the stay subject to continuing review of the adequacy of
the cushion. Since Pitts, the concept of an equity or value
cushion has been a major theme in the reported real estate
162
cases.
In the absence of depreciation or accruing senior interests,
the idea of an equity or value cushion does not relate to the
core protection of the creditor's recoverable value. Indeed, although other cases suggest that there is a connection, the court
in Pitts expressly acknowledged that a cushion in a real estate
case is typically not important to protect against a decrease in
the creditor's interest in the property. Under section 506, the
presence of even a minimal cushion allows the creditor's interest to increase through accrued interest up to the value of its
collateral. 63 Certainly, the mere absence of surplus equity
160. 2 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. C.D. CaL 1979).
161. Id. at 478.
162. The "equity cushion" analysis has been described as "the most important" line of cases involving adequate protection under the Code. Schimberg,
Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Secured Transactions, 36 Bus. LAw.
1347, 1396 (1981). In practice, the equity cushion is occasionally mentioned in
cases involving other forms of collateral, but it is a major analytical theme only
in real estate cases.
163. One commentator has suggested that this result is not necessarily required under § 506. See O'Toole, supra note 44, at 271-72. In practice, however,
this result is commonly assumed by the courts and may serve to explain the
substantial attention apparently devoted to the presence of an equity cushion
in real estate cases.
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does not indicate that the property value and secured claim
will decline during the stay period.
The judicial emphasis on equity cushions is related to
either of two other objectives, or a combination of both. The
first is an effort to reconstruct that part of the real estate loan
transaction that tends to ensure the creditor of an equity cushion throughout the transaction. In this regard, several courts
have held that a more substantial cushion is required in cases
involving a mortgage on raw land. 164 This view tracks traditional lending practices which tend to calibrate the required equity to the type of real estate serving as collateral. The second
objective is to ensure that the creditor is compensated with interest on its loan over the period of the stay. Under section 506
of the Code, post-petition interest is allowed to accumulate on
the claim of an oversecured creditor. In the case of an undersecured creditor, interest can be made a part of adequate protection only through special orders to that effect.
Even if one accepts the premise that an equity cushion
forms a part of the essential value of a real estate loan that
should be reconstructed to provide adequate protection, it is erroneous to treat the absence of an equity cushion as cause for
relief. In bankruptcy, the individual creditor's bargain encompasses not only the original transaction, but also the manner in
which the parties performed subsequent to the loan. The absence of an equity cushion at the time of filing is commonly attributable to the nature of the original loan, or to the
subsequent course of performance. In either event, it cannot
be said that a particular creditor in such an instance bargained
for the protection of an equity cushion. Furthermore, it is not
the role of adequate protection to recreate a transaction in a
way that improves the creditor's position by eliminating a risk
the creditor has already assumed. Where an existing cushion
has been depleted due to improper conduct by the debtor, the
stay can be terminated based on behavioral, rather than
financial, reasons.
While some language in the cases indicates that the absence of a cushion is per se cause for relief, viewed as a whole
and in their factual contexts, the cases generally conform to the
analysis set forth above. In over one-third of all reported cases
65
where there was no equity cushion, the stay was retained.1
164. See In re High Sky, Inc., 15 Bankr. 332, 336 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981); In re
Lake Tahoe Land Co., 5 Bankr. 34, 37 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980).
165. See, e.g., In re Waynesboro Hotel Co., 19 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
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Furthermore, in a majority of the cases where there was no equity cushion and the stay was removed, there were behavioral
explanations related to excessive delay or bad faith, or indications that reorganization was not feasible.166 The view that the
contours of an existing bargain should be retained does not imply creation of a new protective bargain for the parties after
bankruptcy. Where no cushion exists, the issue should be
whether behavioral and feasibility issues justify retention or
termination of the stay. That is precisely the question that appears to control in most cases.
Where an equity cushion exists at the time a petition is
filed, a more difficult conceptual issue is presented. In these
cases, the creditor bargained for and acted so as to retain a
transactional right to a cushion. The issue in bankruptcy becomes whether this bargained for right should be protected. In
cases where an incrementing claim reduces the cushion, for example, does adequate protection require protection against deterioration of the buffer or, if that protection is not available,
termination of the stay?
The apparent answer to this question is that the right to an
equity cushion is protectable in bankruptcy only if it has been
protected and retained by the creditor prior to bankruptcy. Retention of an equity cushion is designed to ensure collection of
the loan notwithstanding inaccuracies in valuation of the collateral, vagaries in the real estate market, or foreclosure costs.
None of these variables are predictably altered by the stay, but
they represent risks inherent in the type of collateral involved,
and the retention of a cushion may be viewed as an important
safeguard against their operation where substantial loans are
typically at stake. As a result, courts often view a deteriorating
cushion as a potential cause for relief or as a reason to require
offsetting cash payments.167
Although protection of the equity cushion has a role in the
reported cases, at least two factors make its ultimate impor1982); In re Selby Farms, Inc., 15 Bankr. 372 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1981); In re
American Properties, Inc., 8 Bankr. 68 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980); In re Bianco, 5
Bankr. 466 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
166. See, e.g., In re Day Resource & Dev. Co., 21 Bankr. 176, 178-79 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1982); In re Accent Assocs., 8 Bankr. 933, 936 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re
Clark Technical Assocs., 9 Bankr. 738, 740-41 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Royal
d'Iberville Corp., 10 Bankr. 37, 39 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 12 Bankr. 149 (S.D.

Miss. 1981).
167. See In re Certified Mortgage Co., 20 Bankr. 787, 788 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1982); In re Gaslight Village, Inc., 8 Bankr. 866, 871 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re
H & F Inv. Co., 9 Bankr. 548, 549 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
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tance questionable. Initially, although the creditor is entitled
to protection of a cushion retained prior to bankruptcy, courts
have not typically held that the cushion must be retained at the
pre-bankruptcy level. Instead, the creditor is held to be entitled to protection of that part of its cushion the court deems adequate, with some uncompensated deterioration clearly
allowed.168 If the cushion is viewed as part of the creditor's
bargain, this approach clearly alters bargained-for rights. It is,
however, an appropriate balancing of the conflicting claims of
creditors and debtors. Unlike depreciation and replenishment
in other contexts, a cushion is a secondary right that can, at
least in part, be sacrificed to permit the debtor an opportunity
to reorganize.
In addition, conclusions regarding the existence of a cushion, and its deterioration or stability, are the result of a contingent, equitable process that may hinge on judgments about
behavioral equities. Although summarized by specific dollar
amounts, property valuation is an uncertain process of estimation.169 In the typical bankruptcy case, a court is faced with
widely divergent expert estimates of value. The court's resolution of this conflict may reflect its views of the behavioral equi7 0
ties and the feasibility of reorganization.
The equity cushion analysis is inextricably linked with the
question of the real estate lender's entitlement to compensation for opportunity cost in the form of interest on its claim. In
a majority of the reported cases in which the stay was retained,
7
courts protected the creditor's right to receive interest.1 ' Most
of these cases, however, involved protection under section 506
by virtue of an equity cushion. No consistent pattern of compensation to the real estate creditor for its investment is appar72
ent in cases where no cushion was present.1
Real estate loans are typically not an appropriate context
168. See, e.g., In re Hewitt, 16 Bankr. 973, 980 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982); In re
Hurricane Resort Co., 16 Bankr. 598, 599-600 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Comose, 7 Bankr. 854, 856 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
169. See In re Pitts, 2 Bankr. 476, 478 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979).
170. See Nimmer, supra note 7, at -.
171. See, e.g., In re Hewitt, 16 Bankr. 973, 981 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982); In re
Bristol Mountain Enters., Inc., 13 Bankr. 412, 417 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981); In re
Graydon, 8 Bankr. 475, 479 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
172. See, e.g., In re Monroe Park, 17 Bankr. 934, 940 (D. Del. 1982) (interest
allowed); In re South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987, 990 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (interest denied); In re American Properties, Inc., 8 Bankr. 68, 71-72 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1980) (monthly payments to compensate for decreasing value of security
interest); In re El Patio, Ltd., 6 Bankr. 518, 522 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (payments of two per cent of the secured claim per year).
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for protection of reinvestment value per se. As indicated previously in comparing equipment liens and floating collateral
liens, this form of protection is not typically implemented on
the basis of a creditor's inherent right to receive interest. Instead, in bankruptcy, protection of reinvestment value is based
on compensation for particular risks in the loan transaction. In
this regard, real estate, being stable collateral, is significantly
more akin to equipment than to floating accounts in that there
are no substantial or unique risks of value loss. A right to receive interest should be acknowledged, however, on an equitable basis in appropriate cases. In contrast to loans secured by
personal property, commercial real estate loans often involve
sums substantially in excess of one million dollars. In such
cases, retaining a stay without compensatory interest can produce substantial financial loss for the creditor. As a matter of
equity this loss should be compensated, especially where it will
not destroy existing opportunities for reorganization.
3.

Behavioral Factors

In real estate cases, core protections are seldom an issue.
In addition, issues of valuation, protecting a cushion, and compensating for investment are generally treated in variable,
rather than absolute terms. As a result, behavioral factors are
significantly more important in resolving adequate protection
issues. These behavioral factors have been extensively discussed in another context. 173 In general, the operative patterns
are fully consistent with earlier discussions in this Article. The
following discussion will briefly review some major issues that
offer relevant comparisons to the other types of collateral previously discussed.
Courts in real estate cases have been more susceptible to
the influence of pre-petition events than have courts considering other forms of collateral. In several reported cases, the
creditor's pre-petition conduct has had a major impact on resolution of the adequate protection issues. Often, this conduct involves special risk assumption by the creditor. For example, in
In re Orlando Coals, Inc., 174 although relief from the stay was
sought shortly after bankruptcy was filed, it was denied when
the court found that the creditor had previously accepted a
long period of pre-petition default without taking action to foreclose. The creditor's conduct was treated as virtually estopping
173. See Nimmer, supra note 7, at -.
174. 6 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980).
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immediate post-petition action. This result is consistent with
the earlier point that the creditor's bargain is defined not only
by the terms of the original loan, but also by the subsequent
conduct of the parties.
The real estate cases also most clearly and extensively illustrate that inequitable pre-petition conduct by the debtor
may lead to a denial of the automatic stay. Unlike inventory
cases, this conduct typically does not involve misrepresentation
of assets. Instead, a frequent pattern involves repetitive filing
and dismissal of bankruptcy petitions designed to delay the
175
creditor's foreclosure, rather than to obtain a reorganization.
A number of other cases involve a transfer of assets on the eve
of bankruptcy to a new entity that subsequently files bankruptcy before foreclosure can be completed.176 In these settings, the debtor's conduct may override other factors and lead
to termination of the stay notwithstanding adequate financial
protections.
Assuming no inequitable conduct, the emphasis of the
cases is on the timing of the request for relief and the feasibility of efforts to reorganize. On both of these points, the real estate cases parallel the cases discussed previously, but differ in
degree and tone. For example, real estate cases generally involve an elongated time frame. In many cases, pre-petition defaults are in excess of one year and requests for relief are often
fied more than six months after filing of the original bankruptcy petition.177 The tendency to continue the stay even at
this late time reflects an apparent willingness on the part of
courts and creditors to allow more time to elapse before denying the debtor continued use of the property. This conduct is
due in part to the relatively stable value of the collateral and
the relatively lengthy foreclosure procedures required outside
of bankruptcy. Against this background, the length of time
from filing to request for relief does not appear to seriously
prejudice the debtor until the time interval approaches one
175. See, e.g., In re Andrews, 17 Bankr. 515, 519 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re
Pappas, 17 Bankr. 662, 666-67 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
176. See, e.g., In re Zed, 20 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Lotus
Invs. Co., 16 Bankr. 592 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). But see, e.g., In re Beach Club,
22 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982) (stay retained notwithstanding transfer).
177. See, e.g., In re Boca Dev. Assocs., 21 Bankr. 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982);
In re Brogdon Inv. Co., 22 Bankr. 546 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Comer, 18
Bankr. 969 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982); In re Hewitt, 16 Bankr. 973 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1982); In re Koopmans, 22 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); In re Graydon, 8
Bankr. 475 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Hurricane Resort Co., 16 Bankr. 598
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Comose, 7 Bankr. 854 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
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year or more. 178 Similarly, although the feasibility of and efforts toward reorganization are recurring issues, courts in real
estate cases involving business debtors do not typically engage
in the close analysis of business prospects that characterizes
floating lien cases. Since real estate loans are seldom closely
connected to current cash flow or operations, courts have justifiably placed little emphasis on the current profitability of the
debtor. Where feasibility is an issue, it is most often addressed
by focusing on lengthy periods of loss, or on the fact that business operations are closed down.179 In contrast, however, especially where real estate is the sole asset of the business and
there is essentially only one creditor, courts may pay particular
attention to the feasibility of obtaining financing for reorganization or confirmation of the plan over the dissent of that
80
creditor.1
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a range of case law involving the
automatic stay in bankruptcy. The analysis reveals that courts
have applied different standards to various types of secured
transactions. For the most part, these standards have been implicit, with no express statement that different contexts require
different analytical frameworks. One result of the implicit application of differential standards is a tendency to generalize
about adequate protection issues, or to seek unidimensional
models to provide explanation or guidance. This Article indicates that although a model which explains the cases and
guides the courts toward appropriate policy decisions can be
formulated, such a model must be derived at a level that permits significant substrata differentiation.
The Bankruptcy Code provides limited guidance as to the
meaning of terms such as "adequate protection" or "cause" in
178. See, e.g., Ukranian Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Trident Corp., 22 Bankr. 491
(E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Clark Technical Assocs., 9 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981); In re Gaslight Village, Inc., 8 Bankr. 866 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re

Mikole Devs., Inc., 14 Bankr. 524 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Oak Manor
Homes, Inc., 17 Bankr. 84 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
179. See, e.g., In re Kingman Warehouse Co., 17 Bankr. 377, 382 (Bankr. D.
Iowa 1982); In re Accent Assocs., 8 Bankr. 933, 936 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re
Allison Corp., 9 Bankr. 827, 828 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); In re H & F Inv. Co., 9
Bankr. 548, 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
180. See, e.g., In re Day Resource & Dev. Co., 21 Bankr. 176, 178 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1982); In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 826 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Castle Ranch of Ramona, Inc., 3 Bankr. 45, 48 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1980).
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the context of the automatic stay. As the legislative history attests, however, such ambiguity was fully intended. The purpose of the Code is to permit judicial flexibility responsive to
changing economic environments and differing transactional
contexts.
Nevertheless, there has been a tendency to attempt to
force adequate protection analysis into a monolithic framework
focused entirely on financial protections. This Article discussed two purported models of adequate protection that, although oriented to diametric results, share this conceptual
limitation. The first model tends to view adequate protection
as solely concerned with protecting the recoverable value of
the property to the creditor. This view fails to capture the diversity and richness of the reported case law, or to reflect the
complex assessment required by the Code. Equally significant,
it would sacrifice significant creditor interests in favor of a uniformly pro-debtor standard. The second model tends, on the
other hand, to view adequate protection as encompassing not
only recoverable value, but also compensation for lost investment opportunities in all cases. Again, the analysis captures
neither the diversity of the case law nor the analysis necessary
under the Code.
In this Article a third, multi-factor model for examining adequate protection issues was formulated and applied to current
case law. This analysis has demonstrated that the model is
consistently applied with reference to various types of collateral. Consistent with the cases, the analysis generates results
that are contextually and behaviorally variant. In essence, the
proposed model recognizes that adequate protection is not a
unidimensional concept, but an analytical framework oriented
toward adjusting the rights of entities with conflicting claims to
particular property. Such adjustment necessarily reflects the
full range of factors that define the conflicting interests.
The proposed model involves three major levels of analysis.
The first consists of core protections oriented to protecting the
creditor's recoverable value from the property. The nature of
existent threats to recoverable value varies with the type of
property involved. Issues of depreciation are commonly associated with equipment, while replenishment of property that has
been sold or consumed is dominant with reference to floating
collateral. Necessarily, the cases track the nature of the threat
and develop distinct protective schemes. Significantly, however, some responsive form of protection of the core interest is
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required in all cases. This requirement flows directly from the
Code, and establishes a financial baseline to protect individual
creditors and to facilitate general patterns of secured financing.
The second level of analysis is more complex and the statutory guidance less explicit. It consists of efforts to restructure
and preserve essential elements of the bargain between the
parties, while providing the debtor a reasonable opportunity to
reorganize. Pertinent variables include cash flow to the creditor, interest on the investment, and maintainance of the equity
cushion built into the transaction. The thrust of this level is
not that the creditor is entitled to the full benefit of the bargain.
Indeed, although all the variables are components of most secured loans, they are not invariant aspects of adequate protection. Rather, they are selectively applicable based on analyses
of the peculiar risks and transactional importance associated
with various forms of secured lending.
The three areas of secured finance discussed herein evoke
distinct and sharply differentiated protective responses. Across
the board, floating lien financing involves the greatest risk to
the creditor and the closest interaction between the debtor and
creditor. Cases involving this type of financing routinely evoke
the broadest array of protective mechanisms including compensation for investment and risk. In contrast, equipment financing is viewed as the least risky and interactive. Protections
commonly safeguard no more than the core of recoverable
value. Real estate loans fall somewhere between these extremes, not because of enhanced risks, but because of the size
of the investment and the creditor's external ability to obtain
and retain equity protection for its investment.
The third level of analysis is behavioral and focuses on contextual factors that strengthen or weaken the debtor's claim to
continued use of the property. This aspect of the analysis most
clearly identifies the equitable base of adequate protection
questions. As this Article has indicated, several themes reappear in the cases. Each of these themes is consistent with
viewing the automatic stay as conferring a limited term equitable right on the debtor to retain use of the collateral. This right
is premised on overall reorganization goals. Thus, the debtor's
ability to retain the stay is clearly related to the particular
stage of the proceedings and the debtor's apparent ability to effectuate a reorganization. The right, however, is also related to
the quality of the debtor's efforts, prior to and during the case,
to protect and deal fairly with the creditor.
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The three-level analysis suggested by this model is complex, but is congruent with the Code and with the context of a
bankruptcy reorganization. That context requires consideration of numerous variables, with the creditor's bargain and
financial protection as relevant bench marks. As illustrated in
this Article, such bench marks lead to different forms of protective arrangements related to different forms of secured finance.
The courts' adaptation to these different contexts within the environment of a single statutory mandate reflects the inherent
benefits of case-by-case resolution of complex issues.

